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Preface
This is a book written by scientific friends of Frans van Poppel on the occasion of his 65th 
birthday; an event that at present still means automatic retirement in the Netherlands. For the 
Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) and the demographic discipline, 
Frans has been and still is of large stature and we have to choose one occasion to show him 
how big his impact is. His formal retirement is a good excuse to do that. 
Indeed he has left a big mark on demographic science. For example, initially, the editors Erik 
Beekink and Evelien Walhout planned to add a list of his publications to this volume, but 
that proved to be a little out of balance, since it would have covered more than 50 pages! 
Nevertheless, it is not in the first place in quantity, but in the quality of his scientific work 
that he stands out. For NIDI he set the standard of making it the rule rather than the exception 
to publish in the highest ranking demographic journals. His dedication to carefully planned 
empirical research has been an example for younger scholars both within and outside NIDI, 
and he has always been more than willing to help out if a colleague asked his advice to get 
around a difficult research problem.
NIDI is very proud to have had such a scholar among its staff. Frans started at NIDI in 1976, 
a year that today is considered history for some. Retirement marks a sort of farewell, but not 
of the sort that Frans is going to leave the scientific stage, or NIDI. As a recognition of his 
contributions to both demography and to the institute, NIDI is happy to offer Frans a honorary 
fellowship, so that he remains affiliated with the institute in the future. 
Without a doubt this Liber Amicorum is not only a fine tribute to him, but also a welcome 
addition to demographic libraries. The topics chosen by the contributors signify the broad area 
that he has covered, and the content of their contributions prove the significant scientific value 
he has added to the field. Taken together, they give a beautiful view of a scientific career in the 
heart of the demographic discipline, where a lot of work is indeed joint work, but nevertheless 
with a clear individual mark. 
The two editors have done a very good job. Thanks to their efforts in a short time a large 
number of first class contributions were collected. I also express my thanks to all authors. 
All participants reacted enthusiastically and swiftly to the request of the editors. Each of 
their contributions reveals an interesting piece of Frans’s career. Taken together, they form a 
beautiful and rich mosaic of a remarkable academic career. 
Although retirement is ‘a sort of farewell’, I am sure his academic productivity will not show 
even the slightest dip around this age and he will continue to work, perhaps more leisurely 
than in the past, on his many demographic interests. So in a sense this collection of tributes is 
a snapshot in a career in full swing.  
Leo van Wissen
November 20128
Introduction
On 27 December 2012 Frans van Poppel, Senior researcher at NIDI in The Hague and 
Professor of Kinship Demography at the Department of Sociology at Utrecht University, will 
retire. After more than 40 years of dedication to academic research he will become honorary 
fellow at NIDI, the research institute where he spent most of his academic career. 
The editors and contributors dedicate this volume with short essays to Frans van Poppel 
and his influential scholarly work. The contributions in this volume –a Liber Amicorum– 
centre around issues that are of particular interest to Frans and which are central to historical 
demography as a whole: The history of the family, life course analysis, historical data and 
methodology, and historical population issues. The contributors, all national and international 
academic colleagues in the field of –mostly– social and economic history and historical 
demography reflect on the influence and impact of Frans van Poppel and his scientific work 
in the field of Dutch as well as international historical demography. They also reflect on their 
joint work, present new findings and insights, and propose new research and methodologies. 
The significance of Frans van Poppel as a historical demographer has been substantial as is 
made clear by the various authors in their essays. In the first place, without any overstatement, 
the responses to the invitation to contribute to this volume were overwhelming. This tells 
us a lot about the personality of Frans van Poppel who is in many respects our mentor. All 
replies were encouraging and enthusiastic with colleagues already reflecting on his work or 
the work they had done together with Frans, the committees they participated in, the meetings 
at conferences and above all, his friendship. In the second place, the range of topics in this 
volume is extensive which highly reflects the academic diversity of Frans. 
A first cluster of essays refers predominantly to the scope and impact of Frans in the field of 
family history, life course analysis and historical demography. What is the influence of Frans 
in historical science and demography? The essays of Dirk J. van de Kaa and Jan Kok, both 
presenting their ideas on the work of Frans in lectures during a seminar in honor of Frans’s 
retirement and organized by NIDI on 11 December 2012, the personal (scientific) note of 
Simon Szreter and the bibliometric analysis of George Alter, should give the reader food for 
thought.
The variation in topics provides, in our opinion, a modest but fairly sound overview of the 
fields of interest of Frans. The scientific essays in this volume are distinguished according to 
research theme: Data and methods, fertility and nuptiality, and aging and mortality. These main 
fields of research are not difficult to discover in Frans’s scholarly work over the past 40 years. 
We could range the essays of Peter Doorn, Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux, Ron Lesthaeghe and 
Kees Mandemakers on the side of ‘methodological issues’ while stressing the importance of 
proper techniques and good quality data. They express both implicitly and explicitly Frans’s 
interest, his initiatives and contributions to the methodological side of historical demography. 
A second issue that is of special interest to Frans van Poppel is the description and explanation 
of differential fertility and nuptiality patterns and reproductive behavior, in particular by 9
social class and religious affiliation. The essays of Hans Knippenberg and Sjoerd de Vos, Jan 
Van Bavel and Aart Liefbroer particularly reflect on this. Frans van Poppel’s dissertation on 
marriage in 19th and early-20th century Netherlands became a classic on nuptiality. Several 
contributions highlight this fact and deal with nuptiality issues: The papers of Shuang Chen, 
James Lee and Cameron Campbell, Hilde Jåstad and Gunnar Thorvaldsen, Pim Kooij, Ineke 
Maas, Marco van Leeuwen and Richard Zijdeman, Jona Schellekens and Tony Wrigley. 
Regarding research on mortality –and again, it’s social and economic differentials–, it may 
be stated that the contributions of Tommy Bengtsson, Martin Dribe, Bertie Lumey, Johan 
Mackenbach, Michel Oris and Mathias Lerch, Diego Ramiro-Fariñas, David Reher and 
Willibrord Rutten show the wide range of topics Frans van Poppel has dealt with in this type 
of research, for instance the effects of childbearing on health and longevity, fetal and neonatal 
mortality, and the impact of heat waves and seasonality on mortality in past, present and 
future.
The editors would like to take the opportunity to thank all contributors. It was a great honor 
and pleasure to work with you to make this Liber Amicorum possible in such a short time span. 
We hope that this volume which, as mentioned before, reflects in our opinion an important 
part of Frans van Poppel’s considerable contribution to historical demography, will be read by 
many people with great pleasure and interest and for some researchers even might be a source 
of inspiration for new research. 
The editors express their appreciation to Leo van Wissen and Nico van Nimwegen for 
encouraging and supporting this initiative from the very start. We thank Jeannette van der Aar 
and Jacqueline van der Helm for their technical support.
Erik Beekink and Evelien Walhout
November 2012Part I
Scope and Impact13
Frans van Poppel: A sort of farewell in 2012
Dirk J. van de Kaa
A perfect demographer
Calling Frans van Poppel a perfect demographer at his farewell party obviously is risky. People 
may well think that, as is not uncommon on such occasions, I’m speaking hyperbolically: 
That I am exagerating deliberately. But I assure you that is not the case. I have to concede, 
of course, that I am measuring his merits against my own standard of what a very good 
demographer should be. But that standard is not too subjective and will, I think, stand the test 
of time. Frans is so perfect because he has an insatiable interest in all issues of a demographic 
nature. He does not limit himself to fertility and the family but has worked on migration 
and mortality as well. He does not shy away from policy issues, has a sound knowledge 
of technical demography, while his knowledge of the literature on population questions is 
unsurpassed. I have never felt disappointed when I consulted him on a specific topic although 
I have to agree that from time to time I did feel a bit overwhelmed. Frans would normally give 
the necessary time depth to his work and, invariably, was in for an interdisciplinary approach 
and for collaborations that resulted in joint authorship with colleagues from a wide range of 
scholarly specializations. And, finally, I trust that his interest in population matters will not 
end upon formal retirement so that this occasion is not the real farewell of a much appreciated 
colleague!
Recruitment
After Hein Moors and Gerard Frinking, in 1976 Frans was the third member of the scientific 
staff who could be recruited by NIDI. I knew for some time that he would be my next 
choice, but effecting his recruitment was not so easy. Piet Muntendam, a very important 
person in the history of the institute, and himself a professor of social medicine, argued that a 
medical demographer should be selected to fill the new position. And, while Frans had made 
projections in relation to the establishment of the new medical faculty in Maastricht, he could 
not really count as such. Another consideration was that one of the tasks the NIDI director 
had was to further demographic research at the universities in the country. Luring away their 
most promising scholars hardly could count as such. A third obstacle was that I had been 
away from the Netherlands during the student revolt and sometimes was taken aback by the 
tremendous informalization in academic life that had followed it. When one day I was invited 
by a certain professor to come and get acquainted, the appointment was set for lunchtime. I 
told my wife not to count on me for dinner as in a faraway university town a splendid meal 
most likely awaited me. But when at the appointed hour I knocked on the door carrying the 
name plate I was looking for and I was invited in, I was offered a chair at the man’s desk and 
was asked whether I would mind that during our conversation he would eat his sandwiches. I 
have never forgotten, nor forgiven, that episode. So when I first met Frans I was a little taken 
aback by his long flowing hair and his contemporary garb. Had he become too informal to be 
suitable as a researcher at an institute with a national mandate? Fortunately I didn’t let it deter 
me and later on found him to be a very dedicated scholar while his blonde locks and height 
proved rather helpful when looking for him in a crowded conference room. 14
Publication record
Frans is a prolific author. Just over 300 publications carry his name. Of these 10 count as a 
book, 82 are articles published in an internationally refereed journal and the remainder have 
appeared in a national journal, an edited volume, or less scholarly outlet. One of the main 
purposes of adding Frans to NIDI’s staff was for the institute to stay in touch with the many 
people in the country and abroad whose work had a distinct historical focus or who did not 
fit in mainstream demography. From examining Frans’s publication record it can only be 
concluded that he has been extremely successful in covering these areas of interest. He has 
done the institute a great service by developing and maintaining an extensive network of 
scholarly contacts and by joining initiatives to collect data or records for special archives or 
databases. His willingness to work with others is quite apparent if one counts the number 
of people he wrote at least one publication with. Our common friend Yves de Roo let his 
computer make the counts for me. The result shows that during his career Frans has had 
no fewer than 375 co-authors with almost 150 unique names. The colleagues he published 
with most frequently were Peter Ekamper (18) and Aat Liefbroer (16) both of NIDI and 
the historian Kees Mandemakers (16) of the Academy Institute IISG. With another NIDI 
colleague, Hanna van Solinge, he collaborated for a publication 11 times. It would have 
pleased Muntendam to see that immediately following these social scientists the medial 
researcher, Johan Mackenbach, features in 5th place on the list with 10 joint publications. 
All in all Frans was single author in almost 30 per cent of the cases and first author in nearly 
58 per cent. With almost 40 researchers he worked together on more than three occasions, 
while with the remaining hundred or so (102) he wrote a joint paper only once or twice. 
The list of names of co-authors is not simply long and impressively varied; it also contains 
internationally well respected names. For example, of Jona Schellekens, Lincoln Day, David 
Reher, Tapani Valkonen, George Alter and George Stolnitz. Frans would seem to have had a 
certain preference for surnames beginning with a B (18) or an S (17) but perhaps these people 
simply selected themselves.
Fields of research
It is fair to say that a person’s bibliography also is bound to reflect his or her main research 
interests. In the case of Frans two broad areas in particular deserve attention. Marriage and 
fertility is the first area and the study of mortality the second. Frans’s magnum opus is his 
book of 1992 on marrying in the Netherlands during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The book 
yielded him a doctorate from the Agricultural University of Wageningen and the distinction 
cum laude. To put the matter in perspective, it is 655 pages long and in present day terms 
would be worth about three Ph.D’s. The book is a lasting monument and will be consulted by 
scholars long after Frans’active involvement in population studies has come to an end. When, 
the other day, I took it of it’s shelf the sheets with the questions I put to Frans as a member 
of his promotion committee fell out. I had written them down carefully. Apparently my main 
concern was that while over time one may calculate demographic rates or ratios in exactly the 
same fashion, their meaning might have changed significantly in one and a half century: Think 
of extra-marital fertility! As far as I can recollect Frans agreed that the concepts of marriage 
and divorce also underwent changes during the 150 years or so he had looked at but not quite 
to the same extent. In any case, in subsequent papers he characteristically studied all sorts 15
of further aspects of marriage, divorce and fertility. Let me just mention the questions of the 
seasonality of marriage, the remarriage of widowers, the effects of changes in legislation on 
divorce, of the role of health selection in the marital transition, of the behaviour of widowers 
in a small city, of changes in the proper age of marriage, in the degree of homogamy and of 
the problems encountered when trying to overcome the death of one of the marrriage partners. 
It is a rich display of topics and interests and the collaboraters tend to change with the issue. 
If one consults an international database on mortality, chances are that one finds a note that 
the data on the Netherlands have been supplied by Frans van Poppel. And indeed, together 
with several others Frans has done his utmost to try and construct cohort and period life tables 
from the earliest possible date. I have always found the two estimates of life expectancy 
at birth for the first half of the 19th century very useful in illustrating the magnitude of the 
changes in the last decades. For the years 1827-1828 life expectancy at birth in the Netherlands 
apparently only reached 36.6 years while for 1840-1851 it may even have been half a year 
less. Just as in the case of marriage and fertility Frans has constantly sought to broaden our 
horizon and to push the boundaries of our knowledge further away. One aspect concerns 
differental mortality: How large were the differences between rural and urban areas, between 
the sexes, between social classes, at different ages, and just after birth or when people had 
become aged? Investigating the causes of death, changes in the state of health as self-reported 
and the increase in the probability of death following the loss of a parent or a partner. The 
relation between marital status and mortality also received attention, while the survival of 
illegitimate children in comparison to their legitimate counterparts similarly was the subject 
of a study. Again, just as regarding fertility and marriage, Frans gave the role of religion his 
special attention. Did it result in differences in infant and childhood mortality? In all of this 
work, that in fact one can see grow almost organically under his hands, Frans always was on 
the alert for the possibility of international comparisons and when international programmes 
in historical demography were being launched the organizers commonly found in Frans their 
representative for the Netherlands.
In all of his work Frans kept an open eye for the theoretical aspects of a study and the larger 
framework in which the topics selected had to find their place. His extensive knowledge of 
population literature built up over many years of reading and acting as a sort of custodian of 
the NIDI library paid off handsomely on such occasions. 
Epilogue
I must admit that with two exceptions, that is when both of us were on the NIDI staff and 
when Frans was the Rogier professor at the University of Nijmegen, I had no reason to follow 
Frans’s career very closely. From a certain distance I was happy to see that he was doing well 
but we never really collaborated nor wrote a paper together. Why we never did is a moot point. 
Curiously enough the situation suddenly changed when Frans was coming close to retirement 
and I was about to become an octogenarian. A few years ago Yves de Roo and I were working 
on our book on the members of the Royal Academy. We then found that calculating their life 
expectancy was both possible and illuminating in assessing their social position. Two or three 
years later it ocurred to me that one could possibly collect information on the birth and death 16
of visual artists living during our Golden Age and in doing so shed light on their survival.   
The then NIDI-director, Frans Willekens, and Frans van Poppel both thought it a worthwhile 
project and when Jolande Siebenga quickly secured a suitable database we could start a fairly 
labourious task. A great problem was that just as scholars, painters and sculptors are not born 
famous so that in many cases approximate dates of birth and death only were known. Govert 
Bijwaard came up with a clever solution for this problem so that, pretty soon now, our joint 
paper will appear in Population Studies.
Presumably that will make me precisely the 150th person ever involved in a publication of 
Frans. A modest position, one might well say, but I’m pleased that at long last I have learned 
first hand what a remarkable and perfect demographer Frans van Poppel really is.17
Ahead, not aloof. Frans van Poppel’s contribution to agenda-setting  
in historical demography
Jan Kok
Frans van Poppel has changed the field of historical demography in two ways. First, by 
constituting a monumental body of knowledge, in the form of literally hundreds of articles, 
book chapters, monographs and edited volumes. His scientific output is, and undoubtedly 
will remain, an essential source for all those seeking information on family and demographic 
behavior in the past. Second, by inspiring others to follow his lead, to take up new topics, to 
explore new sources, and to experiment with new methods. In this brief essay I will focus on 
the latter, and I will do so by looking back as well as by looking forward. Looking at the past 
decades, how has Frans achieved to move the field, and in what directions? And how does his 
work constitute a challenge for the next generation of historical demographers?
Differential demography
Speaking for myself, but surely also for many others –both in the Netherlands and abroad-, I 
think that Frans van Poppel has been exemplary by his choice of topics, his typical mixture 
of qualitative and quantitative approaches, his quest for new data, and finally, his research 
collaborations.  In  terms  of  topics,  Frans  has  early  and  consistently  made  the  choice  to 
work on differential demography. Until well into the 1980s, historical demography in the 
Netherlands had been focused on mapping and contrasting locally and regionally aggregated 
data, in order to understand the epidemiological and fertility transitions of the 19th and 
20th centuries. Frans set out to decompose these aggregates into their smallest components 
possible, with a clear preference for the level of the individual. Although his work frequently 
offers an introduction on spatial differences and trends, the apotheosis is more often than 
not an elaborate multivariate model showing how demographic behavior differed by social 
class, church denomination, and household composition. Moreover, he also integrates period 
effects in his models, such as food crises (e.g. the Famine of 1944/1945), GDP per capita, 
unemployment rates and even temperature. His work proved, among others, that religion and 
social class exerted autonomous influences on all aspects of behavior.
However, Frans was also quick in recognizing that the behavior of individuals had to be 
placed squarely in their social networks. This led him, for example, to explore genealogies 
to reconstruct kinship networks, and to use the witnesses on marriage certificates to study 
the networks of Jews and Christians in The Hague (Van Poppel and Schoonheim, 2005). In 
his choice of topics, Frans has managed to straddle both (social) history and demography, 
thus keeping open the dialogue between these disciplines and countering a trend of academic 
fragmentation and disassociation. On the one hand, and naming just a few examples, Frans 
has contributed to social history by his studies of the ‘housewife ideal’, the institutionalization 
of the elderly, social mobility, the history of leaving home (in international perspective), the 
study of naming practices, and the fates of reformed boys, illegitimate children, permanent 
celibates, and widows. On the other hand, he has taught social scientists the relevance of the 18
ever-changing societal and normative context of behavior and the need to adopt a long-term 
perspective.
Suggesting research topics is one thing, coming up with convincing results is quite another. 
Frans’s  results  appeal  to  a  wide  audience  (going  beyond  historians  and  demographers) 
because of his mixed methods approach. His hypotheses are well-grounded in the literature, 
including 19th century medical reports, government enquiries, ethnographic material, and 
egodocuments. They are tested on representative datasets, often the result of painstaking data 
collection, in many cases by Frans himself. Finally, the analytic handling of the data has 
always been –as far as I can see– of great quality. His dissertation on marriage and divorce 
shows his great love for history and literary sources in the detailed analysis of contemporary 
debates between politicians, church officials, social reformers, and eugenicists on the ‘proper’ 
age to marry. Popular attitudes to marriage are studied through regional customs, proverbs 
and may other sources. In the same book, however, Frans tackles the regional variation in 
marriage in a linear regression model, and goes on to study remarriage hazard ratios in one of 
the first event history analyses to be performed in Dutch historical demography (Van Poppel, 
1992). Another example of his sophisticated mixed methods approach is his study with Hugo 
Röling on contraceptive behavior of medical doctors, in which they combined a history of 
debates on contraceptive techniques with family reconstitutions of a large number of medical 
professionals in Holland. They showed that although doctors were clearly pioneers of birth 
control in their private lives, concerns for the respectability of their profession prevented 
them from openly advocating neo-Malthusianism (Van Poppel and Röling, 2003).
The success of Frans’s research stems –in part– from his fine nose for data. In his earlier work, 
historical census data still played a large role, but Frans soon cast his net wide to include 
sources as diverse as cause-of-death statistics, collections of marital records (e.g. Gouda), 
automatically  reconstituted  family  trees  (GenLias),  archives  of  churchyards,  interviews 
with priests and parishioners, and complete life course reconstructions of regional or even 
national samples of individuals. This could imply, as in the case of the Historical Sample of 
the Netherlands, a long-term involvement in organization, quality control and dissemination 
of the specific data infrastructure.
Agenda-setting
His success can also be attributed to his ability to collaborate across disciplines, generations 
and frontiers. Until recently, historians kept very much to themselves, in terms of data and 
methods. The ‘collaborative model’, as shown by Frans, expanded the scope and relevance of 
historical work through the fine-tuning of hypotheses and results, incorporating specialized 
knowledge (e.g. on statistical modeling), and allowing for large scale or comparative research. 
A recent example is the special issue by Frans and Tommy Bengtsson in Explorations in 
Economic History (2011) on change over time in social class differences in child and adult 
mortality. They refute conventional wisdom by showing that, for a long time, high income 
and high social status were not consistently translated into health benefits. Even more recent 
is his cooperation with Spanish authors (Van Poppel et al., 2012) who had demonstrated that 
child survival affected fertility decisions in pre-transition populations. By replicating their 19
approach on Dutch data, Frans showed on the one hand that this association appears to be 
universal, on the other hand that the effects differed strongly by social and religious group, 
reflecting strong socio-cultural differences in self-agency.
In all these aspects of historical-demographic research, Frans was ahead of the rest. Yet, he 
clearly never was ‘aloof’ – he never distanced himself from the other players in the field. 
As supervisor of trainees, peer reviewer, commentator at conferences, co-promotor of Ph.D. 
students, editor of journals, board member of organizations and in many other ways, Frans 
has encouraged others to take up the fascinating subject of family and population history. To 
summarize: Frans’s track record of agenda-setting amounts to exploring promising research 
fields, demonstrating the added value of mixed methods, investing in data infrastructure, and 
setting high quality standards.
 
However, Frans is only human. There are still areas he has hardly touched upon. Actually, 
some fields may have been relatively underdeveloped by the concentration of Frans and other 
historical demographers on the topics mentioned above. Firstly, Frans has dedicated most of 
his energy to the demography of the Netherlands in the data-rich period after 1850. There are 
still many issues to be addressed in the earlier period. For instance, when and how did the 
positive association between wealth and family size disappear? Secondly, although studies 
on migration are not absent in Frans’s publication list, he has refrained from systematically 
linking migration to other aspects of demography, such as fertility or mortality. Finally, Frans 
is not a ‘system-builder’. In most of his work, he seems to studiously avoid holistic concepts 
such as ‘demographic regime’ or ‘family system’. Also, he is not engaging (probably for 
good reasons) in debates with, for instance, those economists who seek to explain the great 
transformation of the nineteenth century in the form of a Unified Growth Theory that links 
the industrial revolution to fertility and mortality decline.
What next?
Although Frans will hopefully remain active for a very long time, the occasion for which this 
essay was written begs the question: What next? What are now the challenges for historians 
and demographers? For historians, Frans offers, firstly, a puzzling array of subtle differences 
in behavioral responses between occupational and religious groups and, secondly, a set of 
compelling questions on long-term change. Referring to the first, the next generations will 
have to dig deeper still. Thus, we need to find out how the assumed differences in attitudes 
and outlook between Catholics and (Liberal) Protestants have emerged, and how they could 
persist over time. What is the role of social control mechanisms in this respect? Also, the 
distinctions by socio-occupational group identified by Frans may hide other, possibly even 
more important fissures in society. How does the picture change once we compare life 
courses by education, income, property, or even expectations of inheritance? Referring to the 
second, Frans’s studies suggest that change in demographic behavior is more influenced by 
socio-economic factors than by cultural/ideational ones, thus adding to the growing critique 
of diffusionist models. In a recent article (Schellekens and Van Poppel, 2010) it is argued 
that mortality decline coupled with the rise in real wages are the most important factors 
in explaining the Dutch fertility decline before 1940. However, it is still not clear how the 20
supposed ‘quality-quantity trade-off’ functioned at the level of individual couples. Moreover, 
Frans’s analyses of nineteenth century demography need to be integrated into new narratives 
for  non-specialist  audiences.  For  instance,  what  do  Frans’s  findings  on  social  mobility, 
networks and social group differences in mortality and fertility tell us about class formation 
during Dutch industrialization? Can we translate Frans’s remarkable findings on the life 
expectancy of widows and orphans to a new vision on Dutch welfare? And, finally, how do 
Frans’s finding on strongly internalized religious norms affect our view on the meaning of 
Pillarization?
History matters
For demographers, Frans’s legacy is clear: History matters. And it does so in at least three 
ways. First, Frans’s recent work on family composition of adolescents in the past 150 years 
has shown the relevance of taking the long view. The current experience of growing up in 
broken families is mirrored by the many (semi-)orphans in the past (Van Gaalen and Van 
Poppel, 2009). Clearly, the 1950s do not represent ‘traditional’ Dutch society. If anything, 
the period 1945-1965 was probably the most ‘untypical’ period in Dutch recent history 
with respect to family life. The great challenge of historical demography, as demonstrated 
exemplarily in Frans’s work, is to show and understand precisely when demographic behavior 
can be understood in terms of continuity, and when it is subject to change. Secondly, the 
added value of the longitudinal perspective in Frans’s demographic analyses is clear; people 
act on past experiences and we cannot understand demographic events in isolation from 
earlier ones. Finally, history serves as an ideal laboratory for testing socio-biological aspects 
of demography; e.g. determinants of starting, stopping and spacing in a non-contraceptive 
environment, or the intergenerational transmission of behavior (as Frans has done on the age 
at marriage (Van Poppel, Monden and Mandemakers, 2008)).
It is to be hoped that historical demographers will take up this challenge and pursue research 
along the lines suggested by Frans van Poppel. Preferably, by expanding into the more distant 
past as well. Above all, let’s hope that future generations will be able to work in the true 
‘Poppelian’ spirit. That is, by tackling the research questions with a balanced mixture of 
qualitative and quantitative content, soundly embedding them in the literature, formulating a 
clear body of testable hypotheses, cautiously interpreting results, and where possible, working 
in a truly interdisciplinary setting.
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The impact of a historical demographer: A bibliometric approach
George Alter
Since historical demography is a quantitative discipline, it may be interesting to examine 
quantitative measures of our colleague Frans van Poppel’s impact on science. The development 
of citation indexes has resulted in the emergence of bibliometrics, a set of methods designed to 
analyze publication patterns in the scientific literature. This brief excursion into bibliometrics 
is intended to demonstrate how broad and important the contributions of our friend and 
colleague have been. 
The most common way to measure influence in bibliometric analysis is by counting citations. 
The underlying assumption is that scholars are most likely to cite work that they consider 
original and important. A prominent example of bibliometrics is the ‘Journal Impact Factor’, 
which is published by Thomson Reuters as part of their Journal Citation Reports®. Journal 
Citation Reports have been published since 1975, when they were based on the Science 
Citation Index® and the Social Sciences Citation Index®. These indexes were created by 
the Institute for Scientific Information® (ISI), which was acquired by Thomson Reuters in 
1994. The Science Citation Index, the Social Sciences Citation Index, and similar databases 
covering the arts, humanities, and biomedical research are now included in a single product 
known as the Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge® (also known as ISI Web of Science®). 
The measures used here are derived from Web of Knowledge and two other citation databases 
(Scopus and Google Scholar).
These three databases index enormous numbers of publications, but that does not assure 
that they will produce the same results. Web of Knowledge is the oldest service, and it 
includes  journal  articles  back  to  1900  (Thomson  Reuters  Online  source).  However,  the 
selection of journals in Web of Knowledge is more limited and more focused on English 
language journals than other products. Scopus, which is owned by publisher Elsevier, claims 
a larger list of journals and a wider international scope (Elsevier Online source). Both Web 
of Knowledge and Scopus begin with peer-reviewed journals, but they have added other 
publications, including books and conference proceedings. Google Scholar grows out of the 
Google search engine, and it indexes papers on individual websites and other web content 
as well as publications (Google Online source). Microsoft is developing a competitor called 
Academic Search, which is still in ‘beta’ testing.
The first problem in assembling a bibliometric analysis is assuring that we have identified 
the publications belonging to the person of interest. This process, known as disambiguation, 
involves filtering out publications that belong to other people with the same name. Fortunately, 
“van Poppel” is not a common academic name. A search for “vanpoppel f*” in Web of 
Knowledge returned 12 record sets, which could be 12 different people. Most of these records 
point to publications by our colleague, but it is necessary to filter out some articles, such as 
the 1993 article on “Scraper Systems in Pig Houses” published by a different F. van Poppel. 23
Both Scopus and Google Scholar had already used other information to consolidate all of the 
relevant records under a single identity. 
As bibliographic databases become more important, there is an active movement to assign 
identification numbers to individual scholars. Thomson Reuters encourages authors to create 
a ResearcherID, which allows them to establish profiles and claim their own publications 
in the Web of Knowledge database. The Scopus Author ID has similar functions in that 
database. Both Thomson Reuters and Scopus have connected their internal author ID systems 
to the ORCID registry. ORCID (Open Researcher and Contributor ID) is a non-profit group 
founded to create a central registry of unique identifiers for individual researchers and to link 
individuals across existing ID schemes (ORCID Online source). In the future, ORCID or 
something like it will probably connect to record systems at universities and funding agencies.
Table 1 displays the results of our bibliographic searchers. Web of Knowledge, which searches 
the most restricted collection, identified 49 publications that were cited 523 times. Scopus 
found 75 publications and 725 citations. Google Scholar returned 145 publications and 1,440 
citations, but this includes many duplicates. Since Google Scholar counts each version of an 
article separately, a single work may be counted several times (e.g. conference presentation, 
online working paper, journal article, et cetera). We also learn that Professor van Poppel has 
published with more than 80 co-authors (most often with Johan P. Mackenbach and Aart C. 
Liefbroer) and in at least 43 different journals (most often in Population Studies, Annales de 
Démographie Historique, and The History of The Family). His most cited publications are ‘A 
longitudinal study of health selection in marital transitions’ (Joung et al., 1998), ‘Differences 
in self-reported morbidity by marital-status and by living arrangement’ (Joung et al., 1994), 
and ‘A test of Durkheim's theory of suicide – Without committing the ‘ecological fallacy’’ 
(Van Poppel and Day, 1996). According to Web of Knowledge, the authors who have cited 
him the most are L.H. Lumey, J.P. Mackenbach and A.C. Liefbroer, and he has been cited 
most in Social Science and Medicine, History of the Family, Journal of Epidemiology and 
Community Health, and Demographic Research.
Although they differ in coverage, the citation indexes provide a consistent picture of the 
influence of Professor van Poppel’s work. All of them show an average of ten citations per 
publication (10.7, 9.7, 9.9). Moreover, his publications hold up over time. For example, 
among the 55 citations counted by Web of Knowledge in 2011, 31 refer to articles published 
before 2000. Others in this volume will comment on the quality of our colleague’s empirical 
Source Publications Co-authors Number of times cited Citations per publication
Web of Knowledge 49 523 10.7
Scopus 75 84 725 9.7
Google Scholar 145 1,440 9.9
Table 1. Results of publication and citation searches for Frans van Poppel24
and theoretical contributions, but the quantitative evidence is clear. Frans van Poppel has had 
a major impact on the course of scholarship in historical demography, and we can expect that 
influence to be reflected in citations to his work for many years to come.
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On the occasion of the retirement of Frans van Poppel
Simon Szreter
Frans van Poppel has had a wonderfully productive career during which he has surely become 
the premier historian of demography and the family in modern Dutch history. 
His approach has been distinguished by his methodological diversity and preparedness to 
embrace the insights and knowledge that can come from all forms of evidence in addition 
to the quantitative information which he has analysed so resourcefully in so many distinct 
studies.  
It was precisely this liberal-minded open-ness which I found so appealing when talking with 
Frans over twelve years ago about the new oral history research on contraceptive practices 
that I was engaged in with Kate Fisher when we encountered each other in the bar at one 
of the many SSHA conferences, which we have each regularly attended over the years. I 
remember that Frans was immediately very enthusiastic and it was he who was quick to 
propose that we should consider some form of collective publication along with others doing 
complementary quantitative and qualitative research on the contraceptive aspects of fertility 
declines in a number of countries. From this meeting was quickly born the idea for a session as 
at a subsequent SSHA meeting – in Chicago in 2001. This session was a great opportunity to 
bring together historians of fertility and birth control who focused on the cultural, ideological 
and political history of the subject in diverse countries of Europe along with others examining 
contemporary qualitative material collected by social-feminist activists in Scandinavia as 
well as interview-derived, ‘new’ historical evidence from Quebec and Britain. All of this was 
achieved in the six articles published together in the Journal of Interdisciplinary History as 
Issue Number 2 of Volume 34 in 2003. Frans was also instrumental in recruiting the great 
French cultural historian, Robert Nye, to our discussant and editorial team, also a person who 
was a great pleasure to work with. 
Frans’s own contribution was an excellent piece perfectly exemplifying the special issue’s 
main methodological proposal regarding the gains to knowledge to be had from combining 
together both quantitative and qualitative sources of evidence. Together with Hugo Röling, 
Frans demonstrated how Dutch doctors maintained a careful public face of reticence on all 
matters to do with birth control, while nevertheless engaging very effectively in private in 
rigorous reduction of their own family sizes. I recall a particular glimmer of pleasure in 
Frans’s eyes and a broad grin as he presented to us in Chicago the evidence of such systematic 
hypocrisy among these powerful members of a previous generation. 
Frans is a very warm and generous individual who has always spontaneously emitted a great 
sense of fun in what he does, as on this occasion in Chicago. I hope –and am certain– that we 
will continue to see a lot more of this over the coming years.Part II 
Data and Methods28
The census and the historical demographer
Peter Doorn
‘The census tells us who we are and where we are going as a nation’, the United States Census 
Bureau tells us, and: “A census tells us not only about our past, but it can help us prepare for 
our future”.1 Both statements make it clear why censuses are such an interesting source for 
demographic and socio-economic research. If the current census tells us where we are going, 
past censuses tell us where we once thought we were going. Or, as the American census puts 
it: “So, how do we know about our nation? To better understand where we came from, let’s 
take a look back at what America was like during the first census.”
Historical  demographers  can  use  such  old  censuses  to  ‘predict  the  past’.  They  and 
socio-economic historians were the main target groups we had in mind when we started a 
project back in 1996 to digitize the Dutch historical censuses from the first national one in 1795 
till the last traditional census held in our country in 1971. In 1981 and 1991, no census was 
held in the Netherlands, mainly because of a (feared) lack of cooperation by the population. 
And from 2001 onwards, Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS) 
organised virtual censuses based on linked official registrations, with added information from 
a number of surveys.2  Also in the early years there were gaps in the sequence of censuses. 
Since 1830 about every ten years a census was published; the Second World War caused 
a disruption and irregular census years (1947, 1956). It must be mentioned here, that the 
original counting forms of the Dutch censuses have regrettably not been preserved. Only for 
1960 and 1971 we can avail of anonymized micro-level census information. For these years 
the computer files have been preserved, be it that the 1960 files are not entirely complete.3  
The census is indeed a basic source of information about the state of the nation, and as such 
it seems to have great value for historical demographic research. Although it is a rich data 
source, it also clearly has its limitations. Over his career, it seems that Frans van Poppel has 
gradually moved away from using censuses as a prime source in favour of other sources for 
his research. Other sources that are (1) longitudinal and (2) individual, in particular supplying 
information on the changing position of the individual in the household, and on his or her 
health (and eventual death).
1  Explanation on the website of the US Census Bureau of what a census is good for. See: http://www.census.gov/
2  Eric Schulte Nordholt, Marijke Hartgers and Rita Gircour (eds. 2004), The Dutch Virtual Census of 2001: Analysis and 
Methodology (Statistics Netherlands, Voorburg/Heerlen), p. 276.
3  About 300,000 records are missing; for an extensive report see: Michelle van den Berk and Peter Doorn (2007), ‘Een 
digitale detective story: de reconstructie van de Nederlandse Volkstelling van 1960’, in: Twee eeuwen Nederland 
geteld: onderzoek met de digitale Volks- Beroeps- en Woningtellingen 1795-2001, ed. by O.W.A. Boonstra et al. (Den 
Haag, 2007) pp. 471-487. An English version of this paper ‘Reconstruction of the digital Dutch Populations Census of 
1960’ is available on http://www.volkstellingen.nl/en/documentatie/1960/index.html29
Early in his career, Frans was co-author of one of the eighteen monographs published on the 
basis of the 1971 census.4  This monograph focused on nuptiality patterns in the Netherlands, 
starting with an extensive historical analysis, based on the censuses since 1889. Of course the 
tables were not yet available in digital form at that time, so I assume that Frans had to key in 
the data he needed from the published census books himself. Of the last population censuses 
(1960 and 1971, and also of the economic censuses since the 1930s as well), more detailed 
information than ever published survived, which is available in original hand-written form on 
transparencies in the CBS archives, of which a copy was made for use in the CBS library.5  In 
the past few years, many of these fragile originals have been scanned, and part of the tables 
have also been transcribed as tables and are now available online.6 
The Dutch census of 1899 was one of the most extensively published censuses, and it was 
the first census that became available in the form of about 10,000 pages of digital tables 
in 1999.7 It was only natural to invite Frans as one of the authors of a volume of articles 
that was produced on the occasion.8 In his contribution, Frans describes how the Dutch 
population developed from 5.1 million in 1899 to 16 million a century later. But already then 
it is apparent that the census was in itself not rich enough for him, and that he used a variety 
of other sources as well, ranging from annual reports of the Central Statistical Committee to 
mortality tables and genealogical data.
A few years later, in 2006, we managed to publish the tables of the remaining census years 
online.  A  symposium  organised  on  that  occasion  brought  together  a  substantial  group 
of  specialists,  both  from  Statistics  Netherlands  and  from  the  academic  community  of 
socio-economic historians and historical demographers. The ultimate aim was to produce 
a second book of papers on two centuries of the Netherlands in numbers. Of course, Frans 
was also invited. Although we tried to seduce him to collaborate in almost heart-breaking 
ways, he politely declined. He only could contribute if he were allowed to base himself on 
the population register, without using any census data at all.9 Here the breach between the 
demographer and the census was complete.
4  Frinking, G.A.B. and Poppel, F.W.A. van, Een sociaal-demografische analyse van de huwelijkssluiting in Nederland 
1979 VT Monografie no. 6.
5   Several years ago Frans confided me that he had a number of these originals in his office at NIDI. I can only hope that 
he has returned them since then, and if not, may his retirement be a good occasion for returning them to the CBS
6  The handwritten materials of the censuses of 1947, 1956 and 1960 have been scanned; the labour force census of 1947 
is also available as spreadsheets. See: https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/ui/datasets/id/easy-dataset:43969 or urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-
ggb-xtr
7  The original 1999 website is accessible at http://www.volkstelling1899.nl/; this was later updated as http://www.
volkstellingen.nl/nl/volkstelling/jaarview/1899/index.html; the information is archived at https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/ui/
datasets/id/easy-dataset:38770 or urn:nbn:nl:ui:13-988-0dq
8  Frans van Poppel (2001), ‘Van vijf naar 16 miljoen. De groei van de Nederlandse bevolking in de afgelopen eeuw’, in: 
J.G.S.J. van Maarseveen en P.K. Doorn (eds.), Nederland een eeuw geleden geteld. Een terugblik op de samenleving 
rond 1900 (IISG, Amsterdam), pp. 65-87.
9  E-mail correspondence between Jacques van Maarseveen, Luuk Schreven, René van Horik and Frans van Poppel, 
November 2006.30
Is the role of censuses for historical demographers like Frans over? The census seems to have 
become less en vogue as a source of demographic research. Of course it still provides a lot of 
background information or reference data. Direct data from vital statistics registries that track 
all births and deaths, as well as certain changes in legal status such as marriage, divorce, and 
migration (registration of place of residence) probably offer the best sources for estimating 
the numbers of births and deaths and are therefore perhaps more interesting sources than 
censuses registry statistics. On the other hand censuses do more than just enumerate people. 
They typically collect information about families or households in addition to individual 
characteristics such as age, sex, marital status, literacy/education, employment status, and 
occupation, and geographical location. They may also collect data on migration (or place 
of birth or of previous residence), language, religion, nationality (or ethnicity or race), and 
citizenship. 
The potential of the census for socio-economic historians and historical demographers is far 
from exhausted. New ways to visualize  masses of data offer literally new views on hidden 
patterns and connections (see figure 1).  
Figure 1. Multi-level visualisation of the Labour Census of 1899 
Source: http://www.drasticdata.nl/ProjectVT/31
Another new boost is coming from the linked data approach. Several present-day censuses 
have been published as linked open data. The CEDAR project takes Dutch historical census 
data as its starting point to build a semantic data-web of historical information. With such a 
web, it will be possible to answer questions such as:10 
•  What kind of patterns can be identified and interpreted as expressions of regional identity?
•  How can patterns of changes in skills and labour be related to technological progress and 
patterns of geographical migration?
•  How can changes of local and national policies in the structure of communities and 
individual lives be traced?
Census data alone are not sufficient to answer these questions. By applying a specific web-based 
data-model –exploiting the Resource Description Framework (RDF) technology– census data 
will be made inter-linkable with other hubs of historical socio-economic and demographic data 
(and beyond). New generations of historical demographers and socio-economic historians 
will without doubt find new ways to unravel hitherto hidden patterns in historical census data. 
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         Sex ratios in global historical perspective:  
Female surplus versus female deficit
Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux1 
This short paper will put in perspective some historical features of European populations, 
focussing on observed sex ratios and gender differences in number, according to age and 
various socio-economic and cultural contexts, which may help to trace differences between 
Europe  and  Indian  population  structures  and  socio-cultural  behaviours  in  reproduction 
strategies, on the long run. France is taken here as a case study. 
Why did Western Europe experience a frequent female surplus while the Indian continent 
often presented a  female deficit, with suspicion of female neglect and infanticide? It is 
argued that the European female surplus of population may be related  with female labour 
force participation as domestic service, late marriage, frequent celibacy and an overall larger 
autonomy of daughters from family control concerning schooling, leaving home, migrating, 
finding a job and choosing a marriage partner or staying single.
Overall sex ratios in early-modern European towns
When studying pre-industrial urban population in Europe, historians understand from the 
available sources that the female population outnumbered the male population, at least since 
the Middle Ages, as Roger Mols already noticed a long time ago (Mols, 1955, vol. 2, pp. 
218-222 and Fauve-Chamoux and Sogner, 1994). In his path-breaking book, Mols emphasized 
the female surplus in urban societies and estimated that the phenomenon increased in Europe 
during the eighteenth century. There were few cities where this female-surplus model did 
not apply, and these were always cities with specific male communities as in Rome, Italy, 
with so many priests, clergymen and monks (Sonnino, 1994), or as in Oxford, England with 
male scholars being all clerics (clerks), as well as in some garrison towns, or towns that 
attracted many male migrants, be it for a specific male labour market or for the opportunity 
they provided for overseas ventures. This was the case in France for ‘international’ harbours 
such as Marseille, Bordeaux or Nantes. Sex ratios were usually more balanced in the French 
historical countryside than in towns. 
Why privileging ‘Female sex ratio’ (FMR) versus ‘Male sex ratio’?
In Europe, demographers usually agree that the sex ratio of a given population is the number 
of males for a hundred females (Henry, 1980, p. 11; Pressat, 1979, p. 110 and Viet, 1985, 
p. 122). For this paper, I proposed to call this agreed upon sex ratio a male sex ratio, in 
opposition to a female sex ratio, which estimates the number of females for a hundred males 
or, according to the Indian way, the number of females for a thousand males (FMR). The first 
advantage of the latter is that we can trace this proportion in many French historical sources, 
and, at the same time, we are thus able to use it for comparisons all over pre-industrial urban 
Europe. The second advantage is that the female sex ratio allows detailed comparisons with 
1  Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Centre de Recherches Historiques, 2, rue Emile Faguet, 75014 
Paris, France.33
all Indian cases, since it is the way Indian scholars calculate it, and call it FMR as Agnihotri 
explained  in his major book dedicated to Sex ratio patterns in the Indian population: 
“Conventionally, the term sex ratio is used in India to denote female to male ratio, while internationally 
it is the other way around. To avoid any confusion therefore the term sex ratio will be used to mean 
male per 1,000 female population while FMR will mean number of females per male population” 
(Agnihotri, 2000, p. 27). 
The focus of his remarkable study is to map the diverse and complex patterns of FMRs in 
India along different relevant dimensions: age groups, social groups and cultural variables, 
from available colonial  sources and others, using traditionally the ‘female sex ratio’, a figure 
for long quite common in historical Europe. 
Female surplus was a constant fact, especially when considering adult French populations. 
Bayeux (Normandy) was a leader for female presence (138 females for 100 males in 1774, 
i.e. a male sex ratio of 72), owing without doubt to the development of lace making during 
the 18th century and to the generalized practice of working at home for a protoindustrial 
manufacture (El Kordi, 1970, p. 157). Harbour cities were exceptions, although they also 
presented a slight female surplus, when considering the overall population. This phenomenon 
was clear for Marseille, and it was still traceable for Bordeaux. Bordeaux attracted most of 
the migrants from South-West France (Poussou, 1983), either to its male labour market or 
for overseas ventures, while it apparently did not keep its cohort of young native girls. Such 
phenomenon was true at least of the St. André parish, with its male apprentices or ship’s boys 
aged less than 14, so that the female sex ratio there was only 87 females for 100 males. It 
should be noted that sex-ratio data in urban contexts vary considerably from one parish to 
another, depending on the parochial socio-economic structure. Attention should also be given 
to age structure. 
The lowering proportion of children in pre-revolutionary France
Results  from  the  survey  realized  for  Normandy  (1762)  by  Louis  Messance,  and  data 
concerning the town of Pontoise in 1781 (Dupâquier, 1992) show a tendency toward a decline 
in the proportion of children to the overall population. Such a fundamental phenomenon took 
place in the growing large towns of these North-Western provinces of France, not far from 
Paris. 
 
The steady decline of the proportion of children in the overall population during the course 
of the 18th century was apparently a specific French phenomenon in Europe. Two main 
factors accounted for it: 1) the usual practice of putting urban children out to wet nurses in 
the countryside caused towns to lose their children, particularly when many of them died far 
from home (Fauve-Chamoux, 1983; 1985); 2) urban families more and more often practiced 
family limitation (Fauve-Chamoux, 2004), whereas the rural population at that time (before 
the end of the 18th century) was not, with the exception of Normandy, where contraception 34
appeared early, as in some southern societies like Pyrenean societies, where a stem-family 
system, privileging one main heir or heiress, helped controlling reproduction.2  
 
Urban children of the French kingdom accounted for less than 30 per cent of the population, 
whereas those in the countryside numbered about 35 per cent boys aged less than 14, and 
about 30 per cent girls, also below 14. Was this gender difference due to underregistration 
of females? The rather low proportion of girls compared to boys in the countryside was 
apparently a structural phenomenon, as Louis Henry showed in one of his groundbreaking 
methodological studies in historical demography (Henry, 1948, p. 103). The variations of 
sex ratios by age group, as he said, indeed should be understood as part of some natural law 
(Brian and Jaisson, 2007).
European ‘disguised infanticide’ in comparative perspective, without gender discrimination
In Europe, putting urban children out to wet nurses in the countryside affected baby boys 
and baby girls equally. This practice, which spread during the 17th century, has been called 
‘disguised infanticide’ meaning a sort of delayed-action infanticide (Klapisch-Zuber, 1985). 
Infant mortality of nursed babies could be very high (Fauve-Chamoux, 1985; 1997). But no 
gender-differentiated data could ever be seriously evidenced in France about nursed babies, 
be they born legitimate or illegitimate (Fauve-Chamoux, 2002). C. Rollet-Eschalier (1990) 
also did not find any trace of female neglect in the data covering France as a whole in late 19th 
century. As far as one can tell, it seems that there was overall no sexual discrimination in early 
modern Western Europe (and, in any case, not in France) between baby boys and baby girls 
when nursing practices were concerned. It seems also to be the case for abandoned children, 
when gender data are available (Chamoux, 1973, p. 282 and Hunecke, 1991, pp. 46-47). 
But some exceptions were noted in late medieval Italy (Kertzer, 1993) and Gregory Hanlon 
has also given some interesting differentiated figures recently for early-modern Italy, but his 
argument will need further research (Hanlon, 2012). This absence of gender discrimination 
at birth in Europe in the past is probably due to the strong influence of Christianity. But a lot 
has been written on the creation of foundling homes in Europe and the very high mortality 
of unwanted children (Lynch, 2000). Infanticide was rather marginal; abortion was probably 
much more common, even if both actions were severely punished when identified.  This 
European situation was very far from what was evidenced in Japan, China and India about 
female neglect, abandonment and female infanticide (Kurosu, 1994 and Panigrahi, 1972). 
Nominative studies do not show any gender differentiated behaviour towards children in 
historical Europe. 
Indian female deficit, infanticide among elite families and caste traditions.
For India, by contrast, according to for instance Lalita Panigrahi (1972), Sunita Kishor (1993) 
or Rama Deb Roy (1996)3, a number of castes and clans of North Western provinces, roughly 
Uttar Pradesh, Punjab Oudh and of some other Indian states of Rajasthan were known to 
2  For references on strategies of family limitation, Malthusianism and transmission systems, see Fauve-Chamoux and 
Ochiai, 2009 and Duraes et al., 2009.
3  The literature on sex ratio, infanticide and abortion in India is enormous. See for example, Visaria, 1967.35
practice  infanticide  around  mid-nineteenth  century.4  An  1854  investigation  by  colonial 
authorities revealed that in the Benares Division, infanticide was clearly a common practice. 
The lower castes which did not own much land such as the Chamars, Kumhars, Dhobis, 
Telis, Lodhas and Kurmis had higher proportions of females in their population and, at the 
same time, they had no tradition, in their communities, of practicing female infanticide. This 
does not mean that they never practiced it, because they could adopt the dowry system if they 
improved their standard of living.
Hindu families wanted to marry their girls higher or at least equally to her own rank. This 
connection between female infanticide, hypergamic marriage and the constraints of the dowry 
system has been extensively discussed for Gujarat by David Pocock (1954) and commented 
by many authors (Goody and Goody, 1990)5 . And in an Indian society practicing “universal 
marriage”, a girl remaining unmarried was dishonourable for her family. In Western Europe, 
as John Hajnal demonstrated, the frequency of female celibacy was increasing during the 
eighteenth century and age at marriage was delayed (Hajnal, 1965). For a woman, staying 
single was a solution when no good partner was available or when her dowry was not attractive 
enough, or if she had none. 
Nowadays, the problem of female foeticide is alarming for Indian authorities, health policy 
makers and directors of family planning programmes (Patel, 2007). Female infanticide is 
a phenomenon to be always considered in long historical perspective and, for India, in the 
frame of an increasing “northenisation” (Agnihotri 2000, p. 47). 
If the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 assured equal rights to the female children of the family6, 
it did not stop the decline in the female sex ratio (FMR), and it is still common that sons often 
get the best of education and inherit ancestral property. Raising a good dowry to marry a 
girl at a rather early age, according to traditional customs, continues to remain a problem in 
Hindu society, be it rural or urban (Panigrahi 1972, p. 191). The problem of fewer girls is not 
new in India and it requires multidisciplinary perspectives and qualitative and quantitative 
approaches.  
Conclusion
Female surplus in urban European pre-industrial society was an important demographic 
phenomenon but other factors concurred to increase this female surplus in Western societies. 
If it was partly natural, as evidenced by the French demographer Louis Henry in 1948, the 
female surplus was also partly related to the labour market and to the presence in town of 
females born in the countryside and encouraged to migrate to cities by the development of 
domestic service in bourgeois homes (Fauve-Chamoux, 2005). Adolescent girls and young 
women were able to leave the parental home before the age at marriage, which was late, 
and  they  could  earn  a  living  independently  (Fauve-Chamoux,  2003). A  few  studies  are 
4  Cf data collected by W.R.Moore, 1868
5  See Chapter 6, on marriage and the family in Gujarat, pp. 160-179, and chapter 8, on India and Sri Lanka, pp. 229-251, 
in Goody & Goody, 1990
6  For more, see Cave-Browne 1857; Miller 1981, 1993; Pakrasi 1970; Kishor 1993 and Caldwell 2001.36
available on female labour in India for further comparative historical analysis (Moosvi, 
1994), complementing the very many studies on sex ratios and historical traditions leading 
some well-off communities, particularly in Northern India, to female infanticide and neglect, 
followed, in today’s India, by the largely practiced prenatal sex selection privileging sons 
over daughters.7
Fully contrasting with Indian early and universal marriage patterns, traditional female deficit, 
infanticide  and  recently,  gendered  abortion,  the  European  female  surplus  in  past  urban 
context and the large number of unmarried immigrant working women who had left home 
were stressed. One of the basic characteristics of Western European pre-industrial towns was 
the presence of large cohorts of adult women, single or widowed, living on their own from 
their personal work, sometimes with legitimate or illegitimate children, but without a spouse. 
This feature was coupled with a strong domestic service system and a late marriage pattern 
(Fauve-Chamoux, 2011). Abortion was not socially accepted for religious and cultural reasons 
in Western culture. Infanticide was totally banned and condemned by death penalty. Being 
not any more regulated by mortality crises, the natural growth of the population was reduced 
by socio-cultural practices, as Thomas Robert Malthus had identified them (Malthus, 1798): 
Mercenary breastfeeding, child abandonment to charity, celibacy and late marriage, before 
contraceptive behaviours became fully efficient, in a secularised society (Fauve-Chamoux 
2004). 
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Erasmus’ monkey. 
Iconoclastic reflections on two developments in technical 
demography
Ron Lesthaeghe
Two developments in technical demography
During the last three decades the field of technical demography has been characterized by 
two major developments: (i) Corrections for tempo shifts of period measures of fertility, 
and (ii) the shift from variants based population projections to the so-called ‘probabilistic’ 
projections. In this short piece I will argue that neither one delivered a major breakthrough.1 
Instead I think that the two developments cited above are an illustration of Erasmus’ dictum: 
“Even if a monkey wears a golden ring, it is and will remain an ugly thing”.
‘Period paramount’: The opposite view
First of all, it is essential to understand that important ‘period effects’, such as an economic 
crisis, a political turnaround, or a technical innovation (i.e. concerning fertility control or 
prolongation of life) are not synonymous with any superiority of the use of period measures 
of demographic events. That confusion between period effects and period measures seems to 
be ubiquitous despite the fact that they refer to totally different things. The former refers to 
effects of exogenous factors upon the life course, whereas the latter is a technical accounting 
trick. The ‘period paramount’ dictum fails to point out whether period effects are of paramount 
importance over cohort effects or whether period measures are to be preferred over cohort 
measures. The sooner ‘period paramount’ is forgotten, the better, and that in either instance. 
Life is just a bit too complex for such simplifications.
I take it for granted that everyone understands that, with the theoretical exception of utter 
historical stagnation and immobility, successive generations are socialized under different 
conditions, and are therefore by definition not starting from a position identical to that of 
their predecessors. During the 20th century, the growth of education on a global scale, for 
instance, already means that cohorts will be differentiated in aspirations, resources and value 
orientations. These features that are linked to the socialization phase of generations are the 
so called ‘cohort effects’. That is the classic definition, and that’s the one we will stick to. 
And for good measure: These socialization effects are specific for each generation. If all of a 
sudden there is a major expansion of the education system, the older generations will not en 
masse return to school. It is essentially only the younger generation that will reap the benefits 
of it. 
But, of course, during their further life time, these generations will be affected by all sorts of 
‘period shocks’ and disturbances, to which ‘rational actors’ are supposed to adjust. And these 
1  This short piece will be developed into a full article for peer review at a later stage. At this point it only benefitted from 
comments by Tomas Frejka and Tomas Sobotka. 40
adjustments and reactions are the so-called ‘period effects’. These two effects, together with 
the physiological effect of aging, the social influence of family members and peers, and life 
cycle circumstances, largely determine the overall outcome. But the study of period effects 
does by no means imply that only period measures should be used. When examining cohort 
profiles, a given period related ‘shock’ of any importance will show up for all cohorts, but 
at different ages, and in the instance of cohort-period interaction, the magnitude of the effect 
of the ‘shock’ will vary according to the life cycle stage of each cohort. The breakthrough of 
hormonal contraception during the late 1960s and 1970s only affected the stopping behavior 
of older women, whereas it affected the entire fertile life span of the younger ones, thereby 
opening up the possibility for a massive postponement of first births. In other words, period 
shocks are best studied by assessing their differentiated effect at the various ages and life 
cycle stages of each of the successive cohorts. One does not at all need period measures of 
demographic events to do that finer work.
This throws us back to period measures and their use. Period measures are synthetic measures 
that are summations of slices of the life cycle unfolding of different cohorts. Fertility, nuptiality 
or mortality experiences over a short period of time are just summed up to arrive at a final 
product which is not representative for any of the contributing cohorts. These measures have 
no meaning in real life.2  The only exception is of course that of perfect stationarity. In fact, 
to give these period measures any meaning, the stationarity condition –i.e. the hypothesis 
of a frozen society in which cohorts are mere copies of each other– is absolutely essential. 
Incidentally, this not only pertains to the Total Fertility Rate and to the Singulate Mean 
Age at Marriage (SMAM)3, but also to all the indirectly standardized ‘Princeton measures’   
(i.e. Coale’s Ig, Im, Ih or If). All these are frequently used measures, because they provide 
summaries. But only quick and dirty ones. In fact, period measures are merely accountancy 
tricks for impatient users. Indeed, to get an idea of a final intensity4, one has to be patient and 
wait till a certain age is reached by which most of the events have occurred.5  But nothing will 
prevent us from measuring the events up to an earlier point (defined by either age or duration) 
to see where successive cohorts had arrived by that point. One way of doing this is to take a 
2  It could be argued that Kuczynski’s gross and net reproduction rates (GRR and NRR) were major historical steps 
forward. But these period measures and especially the NRR led very illustrious demographers down the garden path 
and into the belief that Europe was going to die out. Despite the fact that the Lexis diagram was long known by the 
1930s, the impact of a tempo shift was totally ignored, together with cohort analyses.
3  The inventor of SMAM, John Hajnal, was vividly aware of this condition, much more so than many subsequent users 
who prefer the blurring effect of SMAM over the clean analysis of proportions married up to a given age (e.g. 20, 25 or 
30) at various points in time.
4  The final intensity of mortality is of course always unity, and much of what is going to be said here pertains to other 
demographic events.
5  The classic objection to cohort analysis is that profiles are incomplete. Here this “impatience factor” shows up very 
clearly. It goes without saying that all one can do is try to complete the schedules for cohorts that are far enough, and 
purely speculate or write scenarios for those that are just starting with the unfolding of the life course. Just face the fact 
that the future is unknown for younger cohorts, but that we can monitor their progress, year after year, with a minimum 
of data requirements.41
benchmark cohort and to study the difference function for other cohorts as measured over age 
or duration relative to this benchmark.6 
The violations of the stationarity condition are the cause of all the problems with period 
measures. This brings us to one major violation of the stationarity hypothesis: Tempo shifts. 
This problem is an old one and already discussed in great detail by our older mentors like 
Louis Henry and Norman Ryder. But the idea of ‘fixing’ the problem by adjusting period 
measures for the speed of the delay is more novel, and was, as everyone knows, pioneered by 
John Bongaarts and Griffith Feeney. More specifically, these authors measured parity specific 
period total fertility rates, and, in the instance of postponement, they inflated these total period 
rates by ‘backwardly projecting’ them with the speed of postponement, as measured by the 
rate of shift in the parity specific mean ages at motherhood. One can easily extend this idea to 
correct the total period first marriage rate, and calculations would be simpler too, since a first 
marriage is a non-renewable event. The Bongaarts-Feeney trick led to several variations, but 
the core idea is always the same.7  There are of course many problems with such measures.
Firstly, how do we measure the speed of the tempo shift? Over a single year (very shaky), 
over five years, or should we opt for a more stable average over a longer time? Furthermore, 
the values of the parity specific TFRs are just period measures and therefore no more than 
synthetic measures that are only representative for women of a given parity, but irrespective of 
generation. First births occur to teenagers as well as to much older women born twenty years 
earlier. That problem is less acute for birth orders three and higher, but then, the contribution 
of such higher order births has systematically dwindled in all populations of the industrialized 
world.
Secondly, all tempo adjusted measures proposed so far only assume postponement, and do 
not offer any perspective on subsequent recuperation of fertility at later ages. The degree 
of recuperation is of course of paramount importance as well, and at the later stage of the 
so-called  ‘postponement  transition’,  differential  recuperation  will  determine  the  degree 
of definitive childlessness and the amount of increase in overall period TFRs. A simple 
simulation suffices to show how the passage from postponement to recuperation, generation 
after generation, will determine the track of the summary period measures. In fact, Tomas 
Frejka has provided us with such a simple and elegant simulation of generational changes in 
postponement and recuperation to illustrate this point.8  This didactical piece of his can also 
be taken as a blueprint to look at real cohort behavior, and to translate that back into period 
measures. When this is done for a set of European populations9 one realizes furthermore that 
6  This can be done graphically or through a modeling of the difference function. For the latest on this issue see Tomas 
Sobotka et al., 2011: Postponement and recuperation in cohort fertility: New analytical and projection methods and 
their application. European Demographic Research Papers. Vienna: Vienna Institute of Demography, 2.
7  Add to that the fact that the latest corrections are very data demanding, much more so than that required for a classic 
cohort analysis.
8  Tomas Frejka, 2012: The role of contemporary childbearing postponement and recuperation in shaping fertility trends. 
Comparative Population Studies – Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft. Preprint release of 27 September 2012.
9  See Tomas Sobotka et al, op.cit.42
the extent of fertility recuperation is very different among these nations and cohorts, and 
that the rises in period TFRs are not just the product of the end of postponement, but also 
and increasingly the product of differential recuperation of fertility at later ages. This then 
leads to the genuine social science question, i.e. why are there such major differences in 
the catching up phase as well? Are they related to social welfare conditions? To provisions 
for working mothers? To different levels of unemployment? To housing conditions? Or to 
ideational differences as well? I wonder whether one would have come to this ‘recuperation’ 
issue via any of the available ‘tempo corrected’ versions of the TFR. The bottom line is that 
all these finer issues are very straightforward and directly observable in the cohort perspective 
of fertility, whereas they are blurred and distorted in the period perspective.
And thirdly, what do we do with such ‘corrected’ period TFRs? Obviously they have no 
predictive power whatsoever.10  But why are the tempo adjusted measures so commonly used 
to warn the public that current levels are just artificially too low and will automatically rise 
once the postponement stops? Such pronouncements are predictions, aren’t they? Reality is 
that not much of a rise will materialize if the end of postponement is not followed by ample 
recuperation, and that in such instances the tempo adjusted measures will equally fall short of 
giving the finer picture. Furthermore, why are most inventors and users of the tempo corrected 
TFRs so typically confronting and validating their outcomes against the cohort measures of 
total fertility with a time lag of thirty years or so? If the benchmark of validation is cohort 
fertility, why then bother with all these adjustments in the first place? 
To sum up, considering their massive violation of the stationarity hypothesis, period measures 
become clumsy affairs in periods of change. Furthermore, since demographers are mostly 
interested and fascinated by changes in behavior over time, they should do better than restrict 
their analyses to such clumsy indicators. And simple adjustments do not alter this fact. 
Expressed with Erasmus’ metaphor, they are only the golden ring on the monkey’s finger. 
Probabilistic population projections: What is ‘probabilistic’ about them?
The classic format of population projections has been based on offering the public a set of 
variants, typically constructed by combining hypotheses concerning mortality, fertility and 
migration. These were often simplified to retain three variants only, the medium, the high 
and the low variant respectively. Of course, in many instances, many more fully worked 
out combinations were offered so that the effects of each of the hypotheses concerning the 
three vital events on the future course and age structure could be isolated. In combination 
with insights from stable and quasi-stable population theory and with those from the formal 
demography of migration and multi-state demography, very fine analytical work has been 
done. Moreover, decisions were often based, rightly or wrongly, on social science insights. 
But in the worst case, one could still retrospectively diagnose where premises were wrong. 
And finally, one has often linked these reasoned outcomes to non-demographic aspects in 
order to come up with highly instructive simulations of the labor force, social security costs 
et cetera. In such instances one not only focusses on ‘variants’ but on complex scenarios of 
what could happen in real life.
10 John Bongaarts has repeatedly reaffirmed this in his presentations or in personal communication. 43
The  so-called  ‘probabilistic’  forecasts  changed  all  that.  No  need  for  any  social  science 
insights anymore. No more construction of the edifice from its finer components such as 
mortality projections, cohort completion of fertility schedules, alternatives about age specific 
immigration and emigration probabilities. All that is needed is a collection of ‘dots’, i.e. 
numerical values of what had to be forecasted (total population size, TFRs …). These dots 
were typically gathered from past observations, and their distribution is then taken to project 
‘uncertainty’ around a given trend. This gives it the name ‘probabilistic’.11 But there is nothing 
probabilistic about the whole affair. Instead, there are arbitrary decisions all over the place. 
Firstly, one has to decide about what set of dots to use. If one is to use the variance of the 
TFR for instance, then it is obvious that there will be vastly different outcomes depending 
on the inclusion or exclusion of the baby boom ‘dots’ of the 1960s. Secondly, how quickly 
will the variance manifest itself? Is there an immediate ‘explosion’ of uncertainty around the 
presumed central trend, or only a slowly widening of it? And, to add insult to injury, where 
does the projection of the central trend itself comes from?  
All of this may be functional to show quick slides for the general public, but the professional 
who wants to dig much deeper is left totally uninformed about the underlying courses of the 
various components. In fact, more often than not the authors themselves don’t know that 
either. For instance, what would a particular track projection of the TFR imply if one were to 
try to construct the underlying changes in age patterns and levels of cohort fertility? Would the 
outcome be feasible? Exercises of validation of this nature are very scarce or non-existent.12 
To sum up, the term ‘probabilistic’ is misleading and gives the utterly false impression of 
being ‘more objective’. Everything that matters in these projections is dependent on arbitrary 
choices, and, to make matters worse, such projections are purely numerical games with dots 
without any analytical insights on behavioral components. Indeed a ‘monkey’, but not even 
one with a golden ring this time.
A last short word…
This contribution is very thin on references since it was not at all the aim to present a 
bibliography here of the all too large literature on these subjects. Nor do we want to vex 
particular colleagues by these obviously highly critical comments. We just thought that 
things had to be put in perspective, and I clearly have my own vision on these matters. Many 
colleagues knew what I thought, but now I committed it to paper. Comments are welcome!
Finally,  does  all  of  this  mean  that  I  am  utterly  negative  about  developments  in  formal 
demography?  Definitely  not!  For  instance,  one  of  the  major  breakthroughs  has  been 
multi-state demography, first pioneered by Andrei Rogers and colleagues to deal with the 
11  Forecasting attempts using judges and their insights to set the trend and boundaries rather than a collection of ‘dots’ 
are much further away from the “probabilistic” idea, and are simply close to classic forecasting based on the Delphi 
method. I would suggest that in these instances the correct terminology be used instead of maintaining the current label 
of “probabilistic”.
12  I am not even referring to probabilistic forecasts of total population sizes in which also crucial factors in the short run, 
such as migration, are swept under the carpet.44
issue of migration between more than one population. Multi-state demography proved to be 
a gem in projections of individual household positions as well (e.g. the Van Imhoff-Keilman 
LIPRO model), and has even been an indispensable tool for well-reasoned ‘speculation’ about 
the religious or political composition of populations. In all these endeavors, one does not lose 
track of the composing elements and transition probabilities, and the output can be understood 
‘analytically’ from the input. With multi-state demography we are at the opposite end of the 
spectrum when compared to the massive shortcut hiding under the term ‘probabilistic’. 
My advice for the next cohorts of demographers? Demography is at the micro level (i) 
the study of individual life courses as they evolve, generation after generation, over time 
and space, and (ii) of the impact of all factors that impact on the life course. At the macro 
level demography is the study of how all these individual pieces add up to a larger whole, 
and how the structure of this larger entity –a population– feeds back into constraints and 
opportunities for its constituting members. Hence, let’s keep the life course unfolding among 
successive generations, and all its intriguing alterations over time and space, as the core, and 
invest in technical advances that are in line with this objective. The way forward in technical 
demography is therefore that of increasing analytical finesse to cope with complexity, not that 
of blunt shortcuts.
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25 Years of collaboration: The Historical Sample of the  
Netherlands and LINKS
Kees Mandemakers
The Historical Sample of the Netherlands (HSN) collects life course data as completely as 
possible for a representative portion of the 19th and 20th century Dutch population. Base of 
the sample are the birth certificates. Most of the data for the construction of life courses are 
extracted from the population registers which makes it possible to follow migrants all over 
the country. This feature makes the HSN database internationally unique.
The HSN started around 1987 with the formation of a work group whose members were from 
different social science disciplines like sociology, social-economic history, social geography, 
economics and demography, all sharing a relatively strong historical interest. The project 
started with a first meeting in an obscure restaurant near Utrecht Central Station, called the 
‘Pepper Box’ photo 1.
Photo 1. Bar Pepper Box in the city of Utrecht, the Netherlands 46
From the beginning Frans participated in the discussions how to build a representative sample 
for the Netherlands. These discussions resulted in the decision to sample from the birth 
certificates as this was the only way to achieve a really unbiased sample. Starting with infants 
also had the advantage that there would be immediate results in the field of infant mortality 
(early death certificates were relatively easy to find) which had the special interest of Frans. I 
won’t repeat the discussions about a proper sample structure, except that we were very close 
to a name sample. A small majority decided in favor of the birth certificates, mainly to be sure 
to have an unbiased sample structure. 
In 1989 the HSN was institutionalized in the form of a foundation, based at the International 
Institute of Social History, and Frans became member of the board. And the last two years he 
is the chair of the HSN. One of the main features of the HSN is the continuous struggling to 
get funding. In this struggle Frans played a major role; especially the acquisition of the ESM 
project (Early Childhood, Social Mobility and Longevity) was important. It was the first 
externally funded project in which the HSN received  money to work on life courses of the 
HSN sample itself, instead of working on oversamplings of the basic sample structure. It was 
also the real forerunner for the enormous jump that came with the millions of the investment 
grant in the project Life Courses in Context (NWO Groot) in 2002. 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the data gathered since the start of the HSN in 1991. As said, 
the sample was drawn from all persons born in the Netherlands between 1812 and 1922 
(n=78,000). 
Figure 1. Development of the HSN-database, 1991-201147
Since 1995 numerous volunteers have been working to build an index of all 19th and early 
20th century civil certificates of the Netherlands, not only containing the names of all born, 
deceased and married persons, but also the names of their parents, places of birth, ages and 
partly their occupational titles. In this so-called GENLIAS dataset, especially the marriage 
certificates have been indexed, resulting in about 3,500,000 indexed certificates from almost 
all of the Netherlands for the period 1812-1932. 
To use these data for scientific research the LINKS project has been initiated by the HSN. 
LINKS reconstructs all 19th and early 20th century families in the Netherlands. Main goals 
of LINKS are the construction of pedigrees (linking marriages certificates of children and 
parents) and families (adding births and deaths to marriage certificates). LINKS is a follow-up 
of earlier work with the GENLIAS dataset, especially for the provinces of Zeeland, Overijssel 
and Gelderland which started around 2006. Actually, in 1993, Frans and I  went to Zeeland to 
discuss the construction of a Zeeland index of death certificates, which would have become 
part of the so-called AKON index (Algemene Klapper Overlijdensakten Nederland). The 
Zeeland index was realized but AKON was overtaken by GENLIAS which started in 1995 
and developed rapidly since then. 
The HSN was and is a mix of all kinds of projects directed at economic, social and demographic 
history based on micro data. The total output of HSN of the last twenty years amounts to 
270 publications and 473 presentations. What might that have been without Frans? Perhaps 
nothing at all, one, given his importance for the HSN as a whole. There are 42 publications in 
which Frans was involved. Most of them focused on mortality with 24 publications, marriage 
counted 9 publications, other subjects were fertility and divorce. The number of presentations 
with Frans is 77 including the one in which Frans and I presented the first results of the 
HSN (at the Historical Demographical Conference in Montréal in 1992). We still worked 
with overhead sheets and I remember that Frans came to Schiphol to present me the last 
versions just before my departure to Montréal! The last ten years Frans is speeding up, giving 
presentations with HSN data at an average of ten per year. And, again, almost all of these 
presentations are co-productions where Frans, as always, takes a great part of the work. 
The presentations of Frans are a goldmine for future work. I only have to remember the 
still unpublished but quite brilliant presentation about remarriages at the SHAA Chicago 
2007 (Who did and who did not? Remarriage in the Netherlands during the 19th and early 
20th century). Figure 2 shows significant differences in the chance of remarrying between 
bridegrooms from different social backgrounds that are still waiting to be further analyzed, 
especially the question why the semi-skilled males were lagging behind in remarrying. Did 
they have better health prospects? Did they have smaller families? Did they have lower 
incomes? Were these workers not attractive partners for women looking for a partner? We 
found that age and marital status of the bride were very important to explain a second marriage, 
but why are these effects cheerfully interacting with social and provincial background? And 
of course the model needs to be improved as well, but that goes too far for this contribution. 
Anyway, with the new LINKS dataset the whole country could be covered, including effects 
of the first marriages as well.48
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Figure 2.  Percentage of remarrying bridegrooms (out of total bridegrooms) differentiated on 
social-economic background, five regions in the Netherlands (provinces of Groningen, Overijssel, 
Gelderland, Zeeland and Limburg), 1812-1922 n=1,059,348)
Source: GENLIASPart III
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Low fertility, economic change and unemployment during the  
interbellum period
Jan Van Bavel
In their recent paper, Schellekens and Van Poppel (2012) show that a very high proportion of 
the decline towards low fertility in the 1930s in the Netherlands can be explained by economic 
change, “leaving little room for attitudinal change” (p. 965). More specifically, their results 
“indicate that unemployment was a major contributing factor to relatively low fertility in 
the 1930s” (p. 983). The question remains to what extent this conclusion holds for European 
countries more generally, especially taking into account that the Netherlands experienced a 
notably late fertility transition (Van Poppel, 1983). The aim of this contribution is to shed some 
light on the matter with descriptive data, hoping to stimulate more sophisticated analyses in 
the future. Ideally, to guarantee high quality, these would be supervised by Frans van Poppel.
During the interwar period, demographers did not attribute low fertility to economic crisis. On 
the contrary, they generally linked it to continuing economic growth and increasing standards 
of living (Van Bavel 2010). Although unemployment soared during the Great Depression, this 
was not considered a major explanation for low fertility. In the judgment of Carr-Saunders 
(1936), “[a]s a motive for keeping the size of family small the fear of unemployment is 
probably far less important than the ambition of parents for their children” (p. 249).
Empirically, demographers and economists have shown that economic indicators and fertility 
are strongly correlated. However, the positive correlation between economic indicators and 
fertility only holds for the short-term ups-and-downs, not for the long term trends. “The 
surface waves are indeed much influenced by economic fluctuations, but the underlying tide 
appears to be an independent and surprisingly stable force” (Kirk, 1960, p. 254). 
Figure 1 describe unemployment rates, per capita GDP and period total fertility rates (PTFR) 
for 11 OECD countries for the interwar years. These figures suggest that the mid-term fertility 
trend, in contrast to the short-term ups-and-downs, was not governed by unemployment or 
by the growth of the economy. For example, all countries exhibit declining fertility during 
the 1920s, irrespective of the level of unemployment in industry and the growth of GDP 
per capita. And in all countries, the decline of fertility halted in the latter part of the 1930s, 
irrespective of the severity of the economic crisis, as indicated by high unemployment and a 
slackening or even declining GDP. 
Figure 2 plots the mid-term relations between economic indicators and fertility in a more 
systematic way for the same 11 countries. The two figures display the relationship between the 
average net reproduction rate for the years 1930-35 on the vertical axis and average economic 
indicators for the same years on the horizontal axes. There is no correlation whatsoever 
between average net reproduction and unemployment (panel A). For example, Canada and 
the Netherlands had about the same level of unemployment as England and Australia during 
these years, even though the former two countries had much higher reproduction rates. In the 51
same vein, during the first half of the thirties, there was no correlation between the average 
net reproduction rates and the average level of GDP per capita (panel C).
Maybe the change rather than the level of the economic indicators mattered? Maybe people 
drastically restricted their fertility in response to worsening economic conditions, irrespective 
of the level they were used to? The scatter plots on the right hand side of figure 2 show that 
this explanation is deficient as well. The drop of total fertility during the early 1930s was 
also not correlated with the mid-term change of the economic indicators during the Great 
Depression. For example (see panel B), unemployment rose much faster in the Netherlands, 
Western Germany and particularly in the United States than in Australia or Norway, even 
though the rate of decline of fertility was stronger in the latter two countries. Or, (see panel 
D) even though the GDP per capita dropped in the United States, the Netherlands, and France 
Figure 1. GDP per capita, unemployment in industry, and period total fertility rates in a range of 
Western countries, 1920-1939 (standardized scales)
Sources: 
-  Unemployment in industry: Eichengreen and Hatton (1988).
-  Per Capita GDP: Maddison (2003). 
-  PTFR: same as Figure 1 in Van Bavel (2010).52
Figure 2. Net reproduction rates by unemployment in industry and GDP per capita (average levels 
in 1930-35); change in TFR by change in unemployment and GDP per capita between 1929 and 
1934*
* Change in unemployment in industry calculated as the difference between unemployment in industry in 1933 and 1929 in 
percentage points; the change in GDP was calculated as the difference between the figures for 1933 and 1929; the change 
in TFR was calculated as a relative difference: The absolute difference in TFR between 1934 and 1930 divided by the TFR 
for 1930.
Sources: - Unemployment in industry: Eichengreen and Hatton (1988).
- Per Capita GDP: Maddison (2003). 
- PTFR: same as Figure 1 in Van Bavel (2010).53
while the GDP continued to grow somewhat in Norway, fertility fell more rapidly in the latter 
country than in the former group of countries. 
Western Germany (WDE) is an outlier due to the fact that, according to retrospective estimates 
based on official census data, the TFR jumped upward when the Nazis came to power. If 
Germany is removed from the picture, the correlation remains very low and not statistically 
significant.
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Socio-economic status and marriage in Northeast China, 1749-1912
Shuang Chen, James Lee and Cameron Campbell
Marriage behaviors in historical China, as well as those in other parts of the world, are sensitive 
to both the underlying socio-economic institutions and the status of individual families. 
Past studies of marriage behaviors in historical China have identified a pattern of arranged 
marriage by parents and an early age at first marriage, compared to that of the populations in 
Western Europe (Lee and Wang, 1999 and Wolf and Huang, 1980). This phenomenon of early 
first marriage is mainly a function of the residential arrangement and inheritance practice 
in historical China. Unlike couples in Western Europe who usually established independent 
household upon marriage and therefore had to accumulate enough material wealth before they 
could marry (Hajnal, 1965 and 1982), in China couples remained in their parents’ household 
after marriage (Lee and Campbell, 1997). 
While  residential  arrangement  and  inheritance  practice  explained  the  early  age  at  first 
marriage among Chinese populations, it was also true that considerable variations existed in 
the marriage timing. Women married early and universally while men had a relatively high 
rate of celibacy (Lee and Wang, 1999). Moreover, differences also existed across populations 
with different social status. For example, daughters of the Qing imperial lineage had a mean 
age of first marriage of 20.7, which is much higher than 18.3, the mean age of first marriage 
for daughters of banner farmers in Liaoning in Northeast China (Lee and Wang, 1999, p. 67). 
The mechanisms that lead to this variation still need further exploration. 
In this paper, we explain how the social and political systems of historical China interplayed 
with individual and family characteristics to influence the chance of marrying. To do so, 
we summarize our findings based on recent analyses of the timing of first marriage for 0.36 
million individuals, living respectively in 700 villages in Liaoning province between 1749 
and 1909 (map 1) and 120 villages in Shuangcheng in Heilongjiang province between 1866 
and 1912 (map 2).  Both populations were institutionalized under the Qing Eight Banners 
system (Chen, Campbell and Lee, 2012). To record their membership to the Eight Banners, the 
government compiled household registers and updated them triennially or annually. Drawing 
from these registers, we construct two datasets, CMGPD-LN and CMGPD-SC, that consist 
of 2.4 million longitudinal observations for these 0.36 million individuals (Lee, Campbell and 
Chen, 2010 and Wang, Campbell, Chen, Dong, Noellert and Lee, 2012). 
The form of major marriage and the denial of women’s property rights in late imperial China 
determined a pattern of female hypergamy and male hypogamy in the marriage practices of 
this period. Despite the existence of various forms of marriage in historical China, major 
marriage, in which the wife moved into the husband’s household to live with his parents and 
unmarried siblings, was the norm. Moreover, as law did not give women inheritance rights to 
her parents’ property, it was possible that the wife entered the husband’s family without any 
property. The unequal property rights resulted in the flow of wealth from the groom’s to the 
bride’s family. At the time of engagement, bride price was necessary to secure a marriage. 55
Map 1. Communities covered by the CMGPD-LN data, 1749-1909
Map 2. Communities covered by the CMGPD-SC data, 1866-191256
Therefore, the socio-economic status of the groom’s family was important to win him a bride, 
while that of the bride’s family was less important for her to be able to marry.
Consequently, a family’s socio-economic status had opposite impacts on the timing of first 
marriage for men and women. Men with higher social economic status always married earlier, 
while women with higher social status tended to marry later. Results from our regression 
analysis reveal that the pattern of higher social economic status raising male marriage chances 
but lowering female marriage chances is apparent regardless of whether social and economic 
status is measured for father, self, or kin (Chen, Campbell and Lee, 2012). For example, 
father’s official position, which brought a family power and wealth, raised a son’s likelihood 
of marrying by 20.4 per cent in Liaoning and 27.3 per cent in Shuangcheng. However, the 
same characteristic reduced a daughter’s likelihood of marrying by 25.7 per cent in Liaoning 
and 21 per cent in Shuangcheng. This striking difference confirmed the pattern of male 
hypogamy and female hypergamy on the marriage market in late imperial China; families of 
lower socio-economic status were more willing to trade their daughter for bride price.
Along with this line, the presence of parents in the household, which indicated a more stable 
family, also affected the chances of marrying for sons and daughters oppositely. Sons with 
both parents alive tended to marry early. A son’s likelihood of marrying was reduced by 
25 per cent in Liaoning and by 14.3 per cent in Shuangcheng if none of the individual’s 
parents was alive. By contrast, the absence of both parents increased a daughter’s likelihood 
of marrying by 39.2 per cent in Liaoning and 29.3 per cent in Shuangcheng. This is probably 
because, without property rights, women became more vulnerable upon parents’ death, when 
their brothers would equally divide family property among themselves.
At the macro level, the differentiation in the timing of first marriage based on social economic 
status became less significant among men. However, our results still consistently show that 
women of lower social and political status married earlier. Here we use registration category 
to measure social and political status at the macro level. This is because, under the Eight 
Banners,  registration  categories  defined  differentiated  entitlement  rights  to  political  and 
economic resources of the sub-populations. Within the Liaoning population, the daughter’s 
likelihood of marrying increased by 43.8 per cent if she came from the lower status population. 
Similarly, in Shuangcheng, being from the lower status category increased a daughter’s 
chance of marrying by 50.6 per cent.
 
Moreover, not only did gender inequality have significant impacts on marriage behaviors, 
but also seniority was important in determining the time of first marriage. Our results show 
that sibling composition and their marital status had significant impact on timing of first 
marriage for both men and women. Siblings appear to have married in order of seniority: 
having unmarried older siblings delayed the timing of first marriage of both men and women. 
Such effects were strongest for unmarried siblings of the same sex, suggesting that sons and 
daughters were in separate queues.57
Above all, our empirical study demonstrates that gender is the most important structural 
conditions to formulate marriage behaviors. The social system featured by gender inequality 
and  the  family  system  that  honored  seniority  interacted  with  individual  and  household 
socio-economic status to shape the marriage behaviors in Northeast China from the 18th to 
early 20th centuries. During this process, although some men from lower status registration 
category still had chances to offset their disadvantages on marriage market, women’s marriage 
behavior were more likely to be constrained by such structural factors as registration category. 
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The incidence of consanguinity in Norway in the late 19th century
Hilde L. Jåstad and Gunnar Thorvaldsen 
Today consanguineous marriages are defined as foreign in Norwegian culture, something 
done by “the others”. Such marriages are more common in other countries, e.g in Pakistan 
whose emigrants bring along the custom to Scandinavia where they are criticized for the 
practice. This con-temporary context makes it topical to know how common marriages 
between close kin were earlier. Following the reformation, Protestants generally accepted the 
guidelines in Leviticus 18, pp. 7-18, which permitted marriage between first cousins until in 
1687 Christian V’s Law banned such marriage. Kin marriage was only allowed between third 
cousins. If closer kin married without royal license they risked losing their assets and their 
homes. This legislation was removed in Norway in 1800, and to the present marriage between 
first cousins, uncles/aunts and nieces is legal in Norway.  Since parishes may function as 
marriage isolates and marriage patterns may be based on geographical proximity, this may 
result in many consanguineous relationships between spouses, which in the next round will 
produce similar genetic structures among descendants (Saugstad and Ødegård, 1977).
 
Several theories attempt to explain the prevalence of consanguinity. One focuses on pro-cesses 
of social class formation, where the maintenance of family wealth and land holdings was 
secured  by  marriages  between  close  kin  (Bras,  Van  Poppel  and  Mandemakers,  2009). 
Economic motivation has a strong explanatory power in studies of present consanguinity as 
well (Stoltenberg, 1997). However, on the one hand maintenance of family wealth correlates 
with consanguinity. On the other hand the highest levels of consanguinity are found in poor 
rural communities with low levels of maternal education, early age at marriage and first 
birth, short birth intervals, and longer reproductive spans (Bittles, 2010). The preservation of 
minority cultures is another theory (Ottenheimer, 1986; 1990 and 1996). A further explanation 
is related to the demographic transition. When more children survived into adulthood it 
increased the opportunities to marry a relative. When family sizes became smaller, rates of 
consanguineous marriages eventually diminished (Davidoff, 2006).
 
Kin intermarriage is usually studied in population registers, but the Norwegian 1891 census 
presents a shortcut since it asked about relationships between spouses who were second 
cousins or closer. At the time, the medical profession suspected an association between 
consanguineous marriages and the offspring’s illnesses. In an international context, historical 
sources with information about consanguineous marriages in such format are rare. Charles 
Darwin in vain tried to lobby a question of this kind into the 1871 British census. In Norway, 
dr. Uchermann and other professors of medicine were interested in the causes of deafness, 
a variable already implemented in the censuses. The Central Bureau of Statistics reluctantly 
and only in 1891 agreed to implement the field: “For married women: Are you and your 
husband related as second cousins or closer? Yes, No.”  Our national analysis here is based 
on aggregates from official statistics (NOS 1891), complemented by a 6 per cent clustered 
microdata sample with circa 120,000 records – a full count of 26 municipalities.
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The proportion of consanguineous marriages increased from the early 19th century peaking 
in the decades after 1850. This was followed by rapid decline in the 20th century, such 
marriages becoming almost non-existent among ethnic Norwegians. Remarkably, the growth 
and decline of consanguineous marriages occurred almost simultaneously in highly different 
localities and regions across Europe and America (Bittles and Egerbladh, 2005; Bittles and 
Smith, 1994; Ottenheimer, 1890; Saugstad, 1977 and Bras et al., 2009). Main findings from 
these studies are related to geographical distribution, the relationship between consanguinity 
and the proportion of non-migrants (i.e. residents in municipality of birth) and population 
density.  
Map 1. Percentage of consanguineous marriages in Norway, 1891. High rate municipalities60
Map 1 shows the proportion of consanguineous marriages for municipalities that had a higher 
proportion of marriages between close kin than the national average –6.7 per cent (the yellow 
areas had a proportion lower than average).  Overall, the map shows a coast-inland dichotomy 
with the highest proportions of consanguineous marriages in inland areas– the provinces of 
Telemark, East-Agder, and Hordaland stand out in the south and west with percentages of 
marriages between close kin 10 per cent or higher. Rates were generally low in the middle 
part of Norway, but the northernmost provinces, Troms and Finnmark, obtained 10.7 and 9.5 
per cent respectively.  Some mu-nicipalities differed substantially from the average: Valle, 
Sirdal, Suldal, Austevold, Jostedal, Lavik, Brekke and Kistrand had above 20 per cent. The 
remote and isolated Røldal parish in the west and Karasjok in the north had above 30 per cent. 
Another contrast is distinctly urban-rural.  In the cities, the proportion of consanguineous 
marriages was on average 2.5 per cent.
 
Earlier studies have argued that high rates of consanguineous marriages correlate with sparsely 
populated areas where the majority of the population consists of non-migrants (Saugstad, 
1977, p. 338). Saugstad further suggests that some regional variation within Norway was 
related to differential social structures, since the Eastern municipalities as opposed to Northern 
and Western Norway differ with respect to mean size of farms and proportions of cottars as 
opposed to landowning farmers (Saugstad and Ødegård, 1976). This is not confirmed in the 
map where municipalities in Eastern Norway had low rates, but is confirmed by the analysis 
of our microdata (Jåstad and Thorvaldsen, 2012). These show that the largest consanguineous 
group is found in the primary sector, and that only 17 per cent were cottars or day workers, 
meaning that the vast majority of consanguineous marriages were among the farmers. This 
analysis also shows that the probability of consanguineous marriage was significantly lower 
among the youngest women, proving that the incidence of consanguinity was being reduced 
in the late 19th century. 
 
An interesting ethnic point is that the parts of Northern Norway which experienced the 
highest levels of consanguineous marriages had a majority of Sámi inhabitants, especially the 
typical Sámi municipalities Karasjok, Kautokeino and Kistrand. Previous studies suggested 
a cultural explanation, the Sámi population having a preference for first cousin marriages 
(Saugstad, 1977a, p. 333). High rates of consanguinity were also found in northern regions 
of Sweden, in areas where the majority of the population are Sámi (Alström, 1958, Fraccaro, 
1958 and Böök, 1948). The high proportions of consanguineous marriages found among 
the Sámi raises several interesting questions that will be explored in future research. One 
question is related to source criticism. If kinship had different connotations among the Sámi 
compared to the Norwegians, this could affect both the economic activity, organization and 
reporting of the household’s composition (Jåstad, 2011). Norwegians depicted the Sámi 
kinship network with expressions such as “to be 17th cousins like the Sámi”, pinpointing 
the extended kin groups among the Sámi. An interesting question is to what extent the Sámi 
reported second cousin relationships when the kin relation was really more remote, thus 
biasing the estimates of consanguinity reported in the 1891 census. During this period the 
Norwegian state increased its efforts to assimilate the Sámi population, so in ethnic terms kin 
marriage can also be understood as a means of identity preservation. 61
Earlier studies have shown that parental consanguinity increases the risk of infant death 
(Stoltenberg, 1997 and Surén et al., 2007). However, we know less about how consanguinity 
affected infant mortality rates in the late nineteenth century when the average infant mortality 
rate in Norway was around ten per cent and the causes were more complex than today. It 
has been suggested that biological heterogeneity or genetic variables may form part of the 
explanation. However, few countries have available data on consanguinity and mortality in 
historical populations (Guo, 1993). A map published in Thorvaldsen (2002, p. 86) shows 
infant mortality rates in Nor-wegian parishes for the period 1876-1880. High rates (between 
180 to 224 deaths per 1.000 births) were found in the provinces Aust-Agder, Telemark and 
parts of Hordaland in the southern part of Norway and in Finnmark province up north. These 
are roughly the same as the high consanguinity areas in the map reproduced here, convincing 
us of the need for further studies of connections between consanguinity and infant mortality. 
The Historical Population Register now being built in Norway will make such studies possible 
with data on the individual and family levels (Thorvaldsen, 2011).
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Verzuiling (‘pillarisation’), ontzuiling (‘de-pillarisation’) and fertility in 
the Netherlands (1920-1980)
Hans Knippenberg  and Sjoerd de Vos
A deviant case
During a large part of the 20th century, the Netherlands have been a deviant case in the general 
(West-)European pattern of fertility decline. Starting in the last quarter of the 19th century, 
the decline of Dutch fertility slowed down from 1910/1920 onwards. In the same period, the 
regional differences in fertility within the Netherlands increased considerably: In 1931/1935, 
the southern provinces of North-Brabant and Limburg had the highest levels of marital fertility, 
which were 89 and 71 per cent higher than the province of North-Holland, which had the 
lowest level.
During the 1960s and 1970s the Netherlands lost its deviant demography as a consequence of 
a spectacular decline of fertility. It changed from one of the countries with the highest fertility 
levels into one with the lowest levels (Van de Kaa, 1987). The total fertility rate changed from 
3.1 children per woman in 1960 to 1.6 in 1980. The geographical fertility pattern also showed a 
remarkable turn. At the end of the 1970s the province of Limburg had the lowest level and also 
North-Brabant now was among the provinces with the lowest fertility levels.
Explanation
It will be clear that general theories on fertility decline cannot fully explain the deviant 
character of the Dutch fertility decline and its changing geographical pattern. These theories 
focus on (mainly economic and demographic) factors, which make birth-control attractive 
and (cultural) factors, which make birth-control also morally and psychologically acceptable 
(Wilson and Lesthaeghe, 1986 and Engelen and Hillebrand, 1986).
Religion is such a factor that potentially influences the acceptation of birth-control. Van Poppel 
(1974) showed that from the last quarter of the nineteenth century onwards, Roman-Catholics 
and orthodox Calvinists (Gereformeerden) had a higher marital fertility than other religious 
denominations and secular couples. That does not explain, however, why during a large part of 
the 20th century, the Netherlands had a higher fertility than for instance its southern neighbour 
Belgium, which was almost homogeneously Catholic. Van Poppel, therefore, pointed at the 
specific kind of verzuiling (‘pillarization’) of Dutch society, which was relatively strong. 
Verzuiling  means  the  segmentation  in  Catholic,  orthodox  Calvinist,  Socialist  and  Liberal 
subcultures and institutional networks.
The  heyday  of  verzuiling  started  after  the  1917  Constitution  paved  the  road  for  general 
suffrage and equal financing of public and confessional primary education (Lijphart, 1968). 
Roman-Catholic  and  (orthodox)  Protestant  political  parties  strengthened  their  position  in 
Parliament and the number of Catholic and Protestant primary schools increased considerably. 
However, none of the confessional ‘pillars’ had a majority position. That minority position 
made them sensitive for their numerical size, not only with regard to the more liberal and 
socialist parts of the population, but also to each other. In the European context, the Dutch 64
verzuiling was unique in the sense that there was a Calvinist pillar alongside a Roman-Catholic 
one, which both resisted birth-control to a greater or lesser extent. The consequence was a 
relatively high fertility of both pillars.
Analysis
Knippenberg and De Vos (2010a and 2010b) recently analysed the municipal differences 
in marital fertility at three time cuts: Around 1930, 1960 and 1978. The first two moments 
represent more or less the beginning and the end of the verzuiling of Dutch society. The last 
moment represents the ontzuiling (‘de-pillarisation’) of society after the cultural revolution of 
the 1960s and 1970s. This paper presents the main results of their multiple regression analyses.
In 1930, by far the main explanatory factor was the rate of Roman-Catholic verzuiling measured 
by the proportion of votes for Roman-Catholics parties at the Second Chamber elections: the 
higher the rate of verzuiling, the higher the fertility. Almost half the variance (48%) in marital 
fertility was explained by only this factor. Infant mortality and Protestant verzuiling also 
had a stimulating impact on fertility. Economic modernization and prosperity had negative 
regression coefficients. All significant factors together explained 65 per cent of the variance in 
marital fertility.
In 1960 there were again strong positive effects of Roman Catholic (% KVP) and Protestant 
(% ARP, CHU, SGP) verzuiling on fertility. Also the proportion of farmers had a positive 
effect, which indicates an element of the traditional agrarian pattern of family bound agrarian 
ways of production. The proportion of high status occupations outside the agrarian sector had 
a negative impact on fertility. All significant factors together explained 69 per cent of the 
variance in marital fertility.
In 1978, there was a significant change in the results of the regression analysis on marital 
fertility. Catholic verzuiling was no longer the main explanatory factor, but still had a positive 
impact on fertility. The strongest positive effect came from the proportion of SGP voters, 
which is the most orthodox Calvinist party. Also the proportions of votes for the other orthodox 
Calvinist parties (ARP and GPV) had independent positive effects on fertility. The proportion 
of the less orthodox Protestant party (CHU) no longer had a significant impact on fertility. 
Socio-economic  status  has  a  negative  impact  on  fertility. Together,  all  significant  factors 
explained 52 per cent of the municipal variance in marital fertility. 
These changes have to do with the strong ontzuiling (‘de-pillarisation’) of the Roman Catholics 
in this period and a mixed development as far as the Protestant ‘pillar’ is concerned: ontzuiling 
of the least orthodox part and a kind of herzuiling (‘re-pillarization’) of some of the most 
orthodox parts resulting in two very orthodox ‘mini-pillars’ of bevindelijk gereformeerden 
(the rank and file of the SGP) and vrijgemaakt gereformeerden (the rank and file of the GPV) 
(Janse, 1985, pp. 161-163 and Stoffels, 1995, pp. 127-152). In Parliament, the Roman Catholic 
party almost halved from 32 to 18 per cent, so did the Protestant CHU (from 9 to 5%), whereas 
the other more orthodox Protestant parties remained more or less at the same level (around 9% 
ARP and 2.2% SGP) or even doubled (0.8 to 1.8% GPV).65
The crumbling of the Roman Catholic ‘pillar’ becomes the more clear when we look at the 
results of a regression analysis on the change in marital fertility between 1960 and 1978. In 
this period the marital fertility dropped considerably from 171 to 90 children per 1.000 married 
women until 45 year. The municipal differences can be explained for 55 per cent by only one 
factor: The proportion of Roman Catholics in population (1960): The higher the proportion, 
the larger the decline of fertility.
Conclusion
The deviant character of the Dutch fertility decline between around 1920 and 1980 and its 
changing geographical pattern has almost entirely to do with the specific political-religious 
constellation  of  the  verzuiling  (‘pillarisation’)  and  ontzuiling  (‘de-pillarisation’)  of  Dutch 
society. The two religious pillars (Roman Catholic and orthodox Protestant) were both in 
a minority position and had to compete not only with the liberal and socialist segments of 
Dutch society, but also with each other, which resulted in a relatively high fertility until the 
1960s. During the 1960s and 1970s Dutch society ‘de-pillarised’ as a consequence of a strong 
secularisation and the cultural revolution of de 1960s. Consequently, Dutch fertility declined 
spectacularly. Only two ‘mini-pillars’ of orthodox Calvinists, the rank and file of the GPV 
(now merged in Christen Unie) and the SGP resisted and showed high fertility levels until the 
present day.
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Marriage and conscription in the Netherlands
Pim Kooij
In my grandfather’s house there was a portrait of his grandfather, who was said to have 
hurriedly married in 1811 to avoid conscription for the Napoleonic expedition to Russia. 
Unfortunately, the story proved to be apocryphal. The man in the portrait was born in 1826. 
Moreover,  the  Dutch  contingent  in  the  Grande Armée’s  dramatic  expedition  to  Russia 
consisted of about 15,000 professional soldiers and volunteers (Jongbloed, 1996, p. 18). 
Nevertheless, the story encouraged me to investigate whether there was any link between the 
exemption of married men from military service and an increase in the number of marriages. 
 
Let us first see what Frans van Poppel had to say on this subject in his dissertation on marriage 
in the Netherlands. Van Poppel’s first concern was not the number of marriages but the age 
of marriage and the regional and social differences regarding marriage, on which subject he 
draws important conclusions. However, there are some observations on the age of marriage 
from 1812 onwards, the first year for which a complete population registration is available 
(Van Poppel, 1992, p. 141), and also the year that the Napoleonic expedition to Russia took 
place from June to December. The data for six municipalities and four regions, which has been 
analysed previously, shows for the greater part a fall in the age of first marriage, especially 
in the towns. Perhaps hurried marriages in previous years have acted as a kind of catalyst in 
this urban fall of the age of first marriage, but this is speculation. We will have to take a closer 
look.
 
Conscription in the form of the forced enlistment of certain members of society had already 
existed for ages, but systematic conscription, affecting the entire male population, was a 
Napoleonic invention. It started in France in August 1793 with the Grande levée, and was 
elaborated in the Jourdan-Delbrel law of September 1798 (Woolf, 1991, pp. 157-158). Every 
Frenchman was now obliged to enlist for five years on reaching 20 years of age, if they were 
taller than 1.57 meters, not handicapped and unmarried. Marriage was indeed a means of 
avoiding army service; however, as the age of first marriage was rather high at that time –for 
men about 28 years– only a few 20 year olds would have gained exemption on this basis. Still, 
there were rumours of young men even marrying old women to avoid conscription (Welten, 
2007, p. 338), although this would not have helped much because only men who had married 
before 12 January 1798, the day on which the first report on conscription by Jourdan was 
launched, received that privilege (Welten, 2007, p. 322).
 
From 1804 onwards, the possibilities for exemption for married men increased and a law of 
10 September 1808 prescribed that married conscripts who had drawn a place by lot were 
to be placed á la fin du depot (Welten, 2007, p. 336). This mostly meant that married men 
avoided service and it was only in Napoleon’s final years that the demand for soldiers became 
so high due to death and desertion that in some regions married men were enlisted. Moreover, 
there were married men who earned their living as remplaçants (Welten, 2007, p. 344).
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The main rules governing conscription were also applied in countries occupied by Napoleon 
(Woolf, 1991, pp. 156-165 and Stoker, 2009). In the Netherlands, conscription came rather 
late, as Louis Napoleon, the King of Holland, did not like the system and prevented its 
introduction (his brother Joseph, King of Naples, did the same). However, after the annexation 
of Holland by the French Empire on 9 July 1810, conscription was introduced. In the spring 
of 1811, a set of municipal Notificaties made clear that no men of a given age could avoid 
military service unless they were very short, handicapped or married, and of course drew a 
low lot number. In the city of Groningen, for example, all the conscripts were summoned to 
appear at the town hall and Martini church on 9 April with good shoes and a sack, ready for 
departure, with the exception of married conscripts (University of Groningen Library, set of 
municipal notifications, PGB D 465 II).
 
Thus, marriage was indeed a means of avoiding active service. Did this affect the number 
of marriages and the age of first marriage for men? There was indeed a rise in the number 
of marriages. According to Hofstee, who analysed the demographic developments in the 
Netherlands for the first half of the nineteenth century, the number of marriages in 1810 was 
higher than in the previous years (Hofstee, 1978, Table 4). The number of marriages per 1,000 
inhabitants in 1810 was 9.9, while in 1808 it had been 7.8 and in 1809, 8.2. This stimulus for 
marriage did not last long. In 1811 the number fell to 7.5 per 1,000, and in 1812 to 7.0. Then 
there was a rise again, to a maximum of 9.9 in 1815, a development which was of course 
connected with the defeats of Napoleon and the coming of peace.
 
It is difficult to determine whether the rise in marriages in 1810 can be ascribed to Napoleonic 
legislation on conscription. This requires research on a local scale focused on the age at 
first marriage for men, which should fall, and the gap between the age of the bride and the 
groom, which could increase. The difficulty is that in 1810 and part of 1811 the registration 
of marriages was undertaken by the churches and they did not record the ages of the couples. 
For this reason, most urban analyses start in 1812. There is only one local study available 
on this subject, the outstanding work by Joost Welten, mentioned above. He found some 
figures for earlier years because the municipality he studied, Weert, belonged to the Southern 
Netherlands at that time, which had been annexed to France in 1795 (Welten, 2007, Ch. 14).
 
In the years after 1810 there is no clear correlation between the regulations concerning 
conscription and the number of marriages. Of course, the number of marriages fell during 
the First World War when the army was mobilized, and also during the mobilization on the 
eve of the Second World War (Engelen, 2009, p. 31). These mobilizations also contributed to 
the character of marriages, but in a different way as, again, my family history demonstrates. 
During the First World War my grandfather had to leave his small home village in Gelderland 
and was mobilized in Dordrecht. He met his future wife there and they married after the 
war. The mobilization for the Second World War brought my father from Dordrecht to 
Roosendaal, where my mother lived. She had been born in Sauwerd in the north of the country 
but her father’s career in the railways had brought her south. These two examples show that 
conscription also contributed to a greater genetic variation in marriages.
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In the 1970s, exemption from service for married men was reinstated. In the previous years 
the drawing of lots had been abolished and married men were enlisted, receiving a special 
allowance. However, in 1976, Henk Vredeling, the Minister of Defence under the socialist 
Prime Minister, Den Uyl, realized that it was cheaper to exempt married men from service 
than pay these allowances. This exemption was promulgated in 1977 (Staatsblad 323). If you 
google ‘Vredeling huwelijk’ (‘Vredeling marriage’) on the internet, there appears a number of 
ego-documents in which people confess they married for that reason. I also know that some 
of my students did so at the time. Still, this did not result in a rise in the number of marriages. 
In fact, the numbers kept falling, in accordance with a trend apparent since 1970, from 7.3 in 
1975, to 7.0 in 1976, 6.7 in 1977 and 6.4 in 1978 (CBS, Statline).
 
These are a few marginal, partly individual comments on the history of marriage in the 
Netherlands, inspired and framed by the authority in this field, Frans van Poppel.
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Religious and socio-economic determinants of fertility limitation by birth 
spacing: Results of the Historical Sample of the Netherlands
Aart C. Liefbroer
Introduction
Frans van Poppel is a towering figure in Dutch and European historical demography. He 
has made major contributions to our understanding of population developments since the 
nineteenth century. He is one of the rare demographers that has studied all major types of 
demographic processes – mortality, fertility, union formation and dissolution, household 
composition, and migration. I am proud that I, as a fellow researcher at the Netherlands 
Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute, have had the privilege to collaborate with Frans on 
a number of articles. I have never encountered someone who had read so widely about any 
topic, and yet had the amazing ability to combine this vast knowledge with very meticulous 
quantitative –and sometimes qualitative– research.
In  this  short  essay,  I  will  present  some  new  results  on  religious  and  socio-economic 
differentials in birth spacing among cohorts born between 1850 and 1920 in the Netherlands. 
I am a bit hesitant to tackle the topic, given Frans’s extensive work on the issue (Schellekens 
and Van Poppel, 2006; Somers and Van Poppel, 2010 and Van Poppel and Roling, 2003) and 
the excellent study by Van Bavel and Kok (2010). Still, I have several reasons to discuss it 
nonetheless. First, fertility control is a topic that clearly has Frans’s interest. Second, I will 
use data from the Historical Sample of the Netherlands (HSN). Frans has been involved in the 
construction and development of the HSN from its inception (and has been a Board Member 
of the HSN since the start) and has widely used it in his own research. A big advantage 
of the HSN is its large sample size, which makes it possible to test whether some of the 
findings from Schellekens and Van Poppel (2006) and Van Bavel and Kok (2010) also hold 
in a larger dataset. In addition, the data allow a first test whether social differentials in using 
birth spacing as a fertility limitation mechanism changed over time.
If individuals and couples wanted to limit their fertility in the Netherlands in the nineteenth 
century, there were basically two ways open to them. First, given the close links between 
sexual activity and marriage, they could postpone marriage, thus leading to a relatively 
late age at entry into parenthood. Second, they could try to avoid or postpone births once 
childbearing had started. Couples who did so, would have longer periods elapsing between 
subsequent births. An important question relating to the use of birth spacing as a method to 
limit fertility is whether the use of this method was more widespread among some social 
groups than among others. Earlier research (cited above) suggests that the use of this method 
was more widespread among liberal Protestants and Jews than among orthodox Protestants 
and Roman-Catholics. Results for socio-economic groups were less clear, with Schellekens 
and Van Poppel (2006) in The Hague finding longer birth intervals for the elite and the petty 
bourgeoisie than for blue collar workers, whereas Van Bavel and Kok (2010) in a study on the 
province of Utrecht, the village of Akersloot and the city of Amsterdam report shorter birth 
intervals for white collar workers than for blue collar ones.70
Data
To examine this issue, I use data from the HSN (see Van Poppel et al., 2012 for information 
on sample selection and measurement of the variables). I have information on all live births 
to couples. Because of my focus on birth spacing, I only select those birth intervals that 
end with a live birth. In all, I have information on 23,624 closed birth intervals from 6,051 
married couples. I performed a multi-level binary logistic regression analysis, comparing 
birth intervals of more than two years and nine months to birth intervals of two years and 
nine months or less. This cut-off implies that I assume that birth intervals in which it takes 
couples more than two years to have a conception that leads up to a new birth are indicative 
of conscious efforts of birth limitation. In all, 29.6 per cent of all birth intervals were longer 
than two years and nine months. I also experimented with other cut-offs. Overall, results were 
pretty similar. In all models, I controlled for wife’s age at previous birth, parity, and birth 
cohort. In addition, I estimated an individual-level variance term, allowing for a control for 
unobserved heterogeneity (full results are obtainable from the author on request).
Results
In figure 1, I present relative odds ratios of having a birth interval of more than 2¾ year by 
religious denomination of the couple. Liberal Protestants are taken as the reference category 
with a relative odds ratio of 1. It turns out that liberal Protestant couples were most likely to 
postpone a next birth for so long. Catholic couples had an odds ratio to postpone for more 
than 2¾ year that was only one third of that of the liberal Protestants, and mixed couples 
and orthodox Protestants also had much lower odds ratios. The odds ratio for Jews was the 
only one that is not statistically significant different from that of the liberal Protestants. This 
suggests that birth limitation by extending birth spacing was much more common among 
liberal Protestant couples than among any other type (with the exception of Jewish couples). 
In additional analyses (results not shown), it turned out that, overall, the odds that couples 
had birth intervals of more than 2¾ years increased by birth cohort. However, this increase 
was much smaller for Catholics, orthodox Protestants and couples with an ‘other’ religious 
background, suggesting that liberal Protestants and Jews were not only already more likely to 
consciously space their birth midway through the 19th century, but were also much more likely 
to increase the use of this method during the demographic transition period under scrutiny.
 
In figure 2, I present the same type of results, but now by socio-economic class. Unskilled 
workers are the reference category, and have a relative odds ratio of 1. Overall, three different 
groups can be distinguished. The elite and the middle class (white-collar workers and petty 
bourgeoisie) had the highest odds ratios and were thus most likely to use birth spacing as a 
birth limitation strategy. All types of blue-collar workers constituted a middle group, whereas 
farmers were clearly least likely to have long birth intervals. All socio-economic classes, with 
the exception of the farmers, became increasingly likely to use birth spacing as a birth control 
strategy throughout the demographic transition. The farmers were the only socio-economic 
class that did not change its behaviour in this regard at all across birth cohorts.71
Figure 1. Relative odds ratios of having a next birth more than 2¾ years after a previous one, by 
religious denomination
Figure 2. Relative odds ratios of having a next birth more than 2¾ years after a previous one, by 
socio-economic class72
Conclusion
These results confirm the finding of Schellekens and Van Poppel (2006) that 19th century 
Catholics were less likely to use birth spacing as a fertility limitation strategy than Protestants. 
However, the HSN also allows to distinguish between liberal and orthodox Protestants, and 
thus allows me to qualify that earlier finding. Liberal Protestants differed in this respect from 
Catholics and orthodox Protestants behaved very much like Catholics did. These latter two 
groups were much more reluctant to use birth spacing as a fertility limitation mechanism in 
the 19th century and the most resilient to change. My results also confirm many of the findings 
of Van Bavel and Kok (2010), again with one important exception. The higher classes were 
found to be more likely to have long birth intervals, thus suggesting that using birth spacing 
as a fertility limitation strategy was most common among these social classes. Farmers were 
clearly least likely to have long birth intervals, and they also were extremely resilient to 
change.
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Long term trends in social and geographical homogamy:  
A plea for an integrated approach
Ineke Maas, Marco H.D. van Leeuwen and Richard L. Zijdeman
Long  term  changes  and  regional  variations  in  social  and  geographical  homogamy  have 
received quite some attention in historical, demographic, and sociological research. Studies 
of geographical homogamy in the Netherlands in the 19th and 20th century show a strong 
tendency for people to marry someone living nearby (Ekamper, Van Poppel and Mandemakers, 
2011; Maas and Zijdeman, 2010 and Van Poppel and Ekamper, 2005). Most studies show that 
during the 19th and 20th centuries geographical homogamy decreased, meaning that people 
found their partner at a larger distance (Kok and Mandemakers, 2008; Maas and Zijdeman, 
2010 and Van Poppel and Ekamper, 2005).
 
Research on social homogamy shows that grooms who either had a high occupational status 
themselves or came from a high-status family married higher-status brides (Van Leeuwen 
and Maas, 2002; 2010). The influence of the father decreased over time (Zijdeman and 
Maas, 2010). Trends in social homogamy on achieved characteristics, such as own status and 
education, are less clear (De Graaf, Smeenk, Ultee and Timm, 2003).
 
Most studies on social homogamy do not consider geographical homogamy. The same is 
true the other way around. Here we argue in favor of an integrated study of the two types of 
homogamy.
Common explanations for social and geographical homogamy 
Explanations of both types of homogamy are often based on the same general theory of 
preferences, opportunities and third parties (Kalmijn, 1998 and Van Leeuwen and Maas, 2005). 
Additionally, authors trying to explain decreasing geographical homogamy or decreasing 
homogamy  of  social  background  use  similar  assumptions.  They  refer  to  modernization 
processes, such as the development of new means of mass transport and the appearance of 
mass communication (Kok and Mandemakers, 2008; Van Poppel and Ekamper, 2005; Uunk, 
1996 and Zijdeman and Maas, 2010). These two aspects of modernization affect homogamy 
through different mechanisms. Means of mass transport allow people to travel over larger 
distances and increase the likelihood of finding a partner outside the local region or outside 
the same social stratum: An opportunity based explanation. Mass communication however is 
thought to be instrumental in spreading information on events, technological developments, 
fashion, and employment beyond local regions. People from different regions and different 
social  strata  may  therefore  have  become  more  alike  and  perceived  cultural  differences 
may have decreased. As a consequence geographical and social homogamy decreased: A 
preference based explanation.
 
If two phenomena are hypothesized to vary with the same determinants, analyzing them 
together has the advantage of increasing power. We can have more confidence in either a 
double refutation of a hypothesis or a double confirmation. If, unexpectedly, hypotheses are 74
confirmed for one dependent variable, but not for the other, it has become clear that the 
theoretical framework should at least be refined.
Regional differences in social homogamy
Some  explanations  of  the  likelihood  of  social  homogamy  predict  substantial  regional 
differences. For example according to the thesis of industrialism it became more rational 
for  employers  in  industrial  labor  markets  to  select  employees  on  the  basis  of  achieved 
characteristics, such as the level of education, than on the basis of ascribed characteristics. 
Accordingly,  in  industrializing  regions  achieved  characteristics  became  more  important 
predictors of an individual’s success on the labor market than ascribed characteristics (Blau 
and Duncan, 1967). This is assumed to have consequences for mate selection as well. One 
of the characteristics valued by suitors in each other is (future) economic success (Kalmijn, 
1998). In industrialized societies and regions, ascribed characteristics should therefore be less 
important for mate selection and achieved characteristics more important, compared with 
preindustrial societies (Uunk, 1996). Macro-level developments such as industrialization did 
not occur throughout society at the same time. Some regions remained mainly agricultural 
long  after  industrialization  had  begun  in  other  regions.  Consequently,  mate  selection  is 
expected to differ regionally (Bras and Kok, 2005 and Zijdeman and Maas, 2010).
 
To what extent regional differences in social homogamy exist, however, strongly depends on 
the extent of geographical homogamy. If a couple consists of a bride and bridegroom from two 
different regions, the relationship between regional characteristics and social homogamy is 
complicated. Most studies linking social homogamy to industrialization consider the place of 
marriage as the relevant region. However, according to the male breadwinner model the place 
of socialization of the bridegroom might be more relevant. Or, alternatively, one might argue 
that the place of socialization of the bride is most relevant, because she (and her family) select 
a spouse most able to give her an economically flourishing future. Characteristics of the place 
of marriage may be good predictors of the marital choices of the couple, because this might be 
the place where they are likely to settle after marriage (although customs sometimes require 
couples to marry in the place where the bride was born). Finally, geographical mobility itself 
–irrespective of place of origin and destination– has been shown to increase the likelihood of 
a socially heterogamous marriage (Pélissier, Rébaudo, Van Leeuwen and Maas, 2005).
 
Rival  hypotheses  thus  exist,  and  at  the  very  least,  geographical  homogamy  should  be 
theoretically considered when analyzing regional differences in social homogamy. Even 
better would be an integrated analysis, in which characteristics of places of residence before 
and at marriage of both bride and bridegroom can explain social homogamy.
Social differences in geographical homogamy
Earlier studies have shown that marriage partners born in different regions –who married 
geographically  heterogamous–  more  often  belong  to  higher  than  to  lower  social  strata 
(Ekamper, Van Poppel and Mandemakers, 2011; Kok, 1998 and Van Poppel and Ekamper, 
2005). There are several possible explanations for this finding. Higher status groups have 75
more resources that they can use to travel over large distances. They more often attended 
higher education, which is assumed to have taught them more universalistic values. As a 
consequence cultural differences between people living in different regions should matter 
less for them. But one can also reason differently. Higher status groups have more resources, 
and thus have more to loose when marrying someone from a lower group. Therefore a 
homogamous marriage is especially important for them. In small communities, they may not 
be able to find an acceptable marriage partner, forcing them to marry someone from further 
away.
 
There is some research indicating that when the size of the marriage market increased during 
the 20th century differences between the social strata in the likelihood of a geographically 
heterogamous marriage became smaller (Van Poppel and Ekamper, 2005 and Van Poppel, 
Ekamper and Van Solinge, 2007). In line with the previously mentioned explanations this 
could be the result of the spread of mass transport, enabling lower classes to travel over longer 
distances as well, and it could result from educational expansion and a spread of universalistic 
values over all classes.
 
When thinking about differences in geographical homogamy it is almost impossible to ignore 
homogamy on other dimensions. Living at a certain distance from each other is inconvenient 
when courting, but, unlike other characteristics, it is not enduring – after marriage the distance 
is  often  immediately  minimized  and  thus  disappears.  Geographical  homogamy  mainly 
comes about as a consequence of preferences of potential spouses for homogamy on other 
characteristics and the varying opportunities to find such a person nearby.
Conclusion
Geographical and social mobility are intertwined to such an extent that analyzing them 
separately leads to incomplete and maybe even misleading conclusions. Researchers interested 
in geographical homogamy are well advised to consider homogamy on other dimensions as 
well, such as social homogamy, but also religious and age homogamy (Kalmijn, Liefbroer, 
Van Poppel and Van Solinge, 2006; Van Poppel, Liefbroer, Vermunt and Smeenk, 2001 and 
Van Poppel and Liefbroer, 2001). Those who are primarily interested in social homogamy 
should think about consequences of geographical mobility and homogamy, especially when 
they are interested in regional differences and macro-level explanations. 
 
This book is devoted to the scholarly work of Frans van Poppel. His work is an excellent 
stepping stone for an integrated approach of social and geographical homogamy. He publishes 
on marriage in general (Van Poppel, 1992) and on social, geographical and other types of 
homogamy (cited above). And he plays an important role in the collection of micro-historical 
data, such as the Historical Sample of the Netherlands, currently as its chairperson. We 
personally learned a lot from him and have many reasons to be grateful. Frans: thank you!76
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Origins of the ‘western European marriage pattern’
Jona Schellekens
Frans and I first met through our common interest in historical nuptiality patterns. Therefore 
I would like to devote this essay in his honour to reflections on the origins of the western 
European Marriage Pattern (EMP). As Frans would have expected me to do, I will take 
socio-economic stratification into account (e.g. Van Poppel and Nelissen, 1999a). This essay 
will focus on the lower classes.
Long before marital fertility started to decline, nuptiality was already low in northwestern 
Europe. John Hajnal (1965) was the first demographer to draw attention to this phenomenon. 
He thought an origin of the pattern of low nuptiality in the 16th century to be likely. More 
recent research, however, suggests that in England nuptiality was already low in the second 
half of the 14th century (Smith 1979, pp. 83-4 and Goldberg, 1992, pp. 203-79). 
Hajnal was also the first to suggest an explanation: “The economic system influences the 
marriage pattern through the arrangements by which the economic basis for the support of 
a couple and their children is established” (1965, p. 132). Ultimately, Hajnal’s explanation 
goes back to Malthus’ model of the preventive check. Malthus’ model reflects middle-class 
values, which he and his followers wished to impose on the lower classes (Van Poppel and 
Nelissen, 1999b, pp. 59-63). Whereas children of middle-class parents could often count on 
intergenerational transfers, children from the lower classes were much less likely to receive 
enough assets from their parents. 
In rural areas, agricultural labourers made up the bulk of the lower class. Even though farm 
servants came from all layers of rural society, a disproportionate number were children 
of agricultural labourers (Mitterauer, 1990, p. 21). Peter Laslett (1977) called the type of 
servant typical of northwestern Europe ‘life-cycle’ servants, because service usually was 
a stage in the life cycle during which they were not allowed to marry. Tony Wrigley and 
Roger Schofield (1981) asserted that the timing of the marriage of farm servants was mostly 
a function of the time needed to save enough assets to set up an independent household. In 
their neo-Malthusian model falling real incomes raised the time needed to accumulate enough 
resources to set up an independent household. This neo-Malthusian model, however, raises at 
least two problems (for more problems see Weir, 1984 and reply by Schofield, 1985). First, 
Malthus proposed a different model for servants. And second, the neo-Malthusian model does 
not seem to fit the data.
Even if farm servants were able to save toward marriage, it does not follow from this that they 
would marry as soon as they had accumulated sufficient assets to set up a household. Living 
in farmhouses, where they were better fed and had more comforts than in a cottage, servants 
enjoyed a relatively high standard of living compared with what many of them could expect 
after marriage. Hence, servants were in no rush to get married (Schellekens, 1991 and 1997). 
Malthus (1826, p. 399) mentions a similar mechanism, when discussing the postponement 79
of marriage among domestic servants: “The servants who live in the families of the rich 
… possess the necessaries, and even the comforts of life, almost in as great plenty as their 
masters. Their work is easy and their food luxurious, compared with the work and food of the 
class of labourers; “ […] The greater number of them, therefore, deterred by this uninviting 
view of their future situation, content themselves with remaining single [...].” 
In the Middle Ages the degree to which a servant could save may have been limited. Female 
servants  often  worked  purely  for  their  food,  lodging,  and  clothes  (Goldberg,  1992,  pp. 
185-86). Hence, Jeremy Goldberg (1992, pp. 345-56) preferred an “anti-Malthusian” model 
of nuptiality, in which an increase in the demand for female servants suppresses nuptiality. 
Thus, after the Black Death the expansion of pastoral agriculture suppressed nuptiality by 
raising the demand for maidservants (see also Voigtländer and Voth, 2009, pp. 251-52).
Wrigley and Schofield (1981) asserted that long-term trends in real wages explain long-term 
trends in English nuptiality (see also Smith 1981). Ann Kussmaul (1981, pp. 111-112), on the 
other hand, asserted that long-term trends in the demand for farm servants explain long-term 
trends in nuptiality. Her anti-Malthusian model seems to fit the data for eighteenth-century 
England better than the neo-Malthusian model of Wrigley and Schofield (Schellekens, 1997; 
2001, pp. 5-6).
The anti-Malthusian model may explain long-term trends in nuptiality, but it does not explain 
the origins of the EMP. Carl Hammer (1983, p. 247) noticed that the area where the EMP is 
to be found in the early modern period is precisely the area of the medieval manorial system. 
Hence, he suggested that the origins of the EMP are to be found in restrictions imposed by 
manor lords on the nuptial behavior of their tenants (see also Mitterauer, 1990, pp. 27-28). 
The medieval manor was an agricultural estate divided into two parts. The first was the 
demesne owned by the lord; the second consisted of smaller farms held on terms that required 
tenants to perform labour services for the lord and to make incidental payments to him in kind 
and cash. 
To the extent that his model of worker exchange fits the ninth-century Bavarian data, Hammer 
(1983, pp. 245-248) appears to have uncovered the oldest evidence for life-cycle servants. 
They were employed on the demesne and on larger tenant farms. These servants were not 
the children of free tenants, however, but of serfs. If Hammer is correct, however, how do we 
explain the survival of an institution that had its roots in forced labour (Mitterauer, 1990, p. 
28)? What made farm service so attractive that it survived the manorial system? Following 
Malthus (1826, p. 399), I would like to suggest that farm servants who were recruited on a 
free labour market, replacing the forced labour from the manor, contented themselves with 
remaining single, because in the farmhouse of their employer they were better fed and had 
more comforts than in a cottage.80
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The West European marriage system in early modern Europe
Tony Wrigley
Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo were unanimous and firm in insisting 
that while economic growth was possible it was necessarily limited. The path of growth was 
asymptotic; it could not become exponential. This conclusion stemmed from the fact that, 
while the supply of labour and of capital might be extended as required, the supply of land 
could not be similarly extended. Since the land supplied almost all the raw materials which 
entered production as well as all food supplies, economic expansion either meant taking into 
cultivation poorer land or using existing farmland more intensively which in turn must mean 
declining returns both to labour and capital. In short, the very process of growth involved 
changes which must at some stage bring it to a halt.
The implications of this scenario for the standard of living of the population were gloomy, 
especially if linked to the argument which Malthus developed about the character of the 
demography of the societies of his day. He suggested that at best output might grow by 
arithmetic progression but population would rise by geometric progression unless checked. A 
period of comparative prosperity would allow fertility rates to stay well clear of mortality rates 
and the population would increase but at some point this would cause heightened pressure on 
available resources, mortality would rise, and population growth would cease with the bulk of 
the population living close to the subsistence level. Malthus had published the first Essay as 
a young man aged 32 and subsequently modified the rigour of his initial stance considerably 
but it was the argument of the first Essay which lodged in the public mind.
The model which Malthus had sketched proved influential in many contexts. It was, for 
example, reading the Essay which suggested to Charles Darwin a simple and invariant 
mechanism  to  drive  the  process  of  natural  selection  in  animal  populations.  In  human 
populations, however, matters were less simple. Fertility levels were strongly affected by 
nuptiality and, since marriage customs differed substantially between societies, his model in 
its simplest form failed to do justice to a complex reality.
An account of the West European marriage system (WEM) in comparison with other marriage 
systems illustrates the limitations of a simple model in doing justice to the complexity of 
individual and social behaviour. Even supposing that in organic societies economic growth 
must cease because of the land constraint and that when this occurs population growth will 
also cease with fertility and mortality both at the same level, it does not follow that this 
implies an equal degree of misery in different populations. Figure 1 illustrates the point. 
Where fertility is high invariant mortality must at some point rise to the same level placing 
the community in question under great stress and causing a severe decline in living standards. 
Fertility, however may be invariant but at a lower level. In this case also, mortality will rise 
to equal it, but growth will cease at a point which leaves living standards at a higher level. If 
fertility also is responsive to pressure and declines as living standards deteriorate a still more 
favourable outcome is possible. The nature of the WEM makes this relatively favourable 
outcome more likely.82
A key feature of this system was that a newly married couple were normally expected to 
create a new household rather than to join an existing one. There was therefore an economic 
hurdle to be surmounted before a marriage could take place which would cause marriage to 
be delayed if economic circumstances were unfavourable. For example, figure 2 shows that 
in England in the 17th and 18th centuries trends in real wages and the average age at marriage 
moved in parallel. When conditions were hard marriage age rose; when conditions improved 
marriage age declined. Moreover, whereas in most other societies marriage for women not 
only took place soon after attaining sexual maturity (indeed in some societies frequently 
before this point), it was also virtually universal. In general only women with serious physical 
or mental handicaps remained single. But in the WEM a significant proportion of each rising 
generation of women never married, and the prevalence of celibacy might also be sensitive to 
economic conditions. The WEM was therefore conducive to somewhat higher living standards 
than was common in other societies, and given the characteristic income elasticity of demand 
Figure 1. Fertility, mortality, and living standards83
for basic necessities compared to other products, the structure of aggregate consumer demand 
under the WEM would encourage the development of a wider range of industrial production.
A further benefit of a low-pressure demographic system (i.e. one in which both fertility and 
mortality are relatively low) stems from the fact that where fertility is comparatively low 
the age structure will be such that a higher proportion of the population is of working age 
than where fertility is higher. A lower dependency ratio implies a higher standard of living, 
ceteris paribus. Similarly, since lower mortality meant that a higher proportion of each new 
generation survived to working age, the proportion of the community’s resources devoted 
to the sustenance of children who do not survive is lower in a low-pressure environment. 
Furthermore, since unmarried women participated more fully in production activities than 
married women, late marriage and relatively high celibacy levels were also attended with 
economic benefits.
It was not necessarily the case that in societies where marriage for women occurred early in 
life and few women remained unmarried fertility and mortality were higher than was normal 
in a West European setting. A variety of practices might result in relatively long birth intervals 
and a wide prevalence of infanticide might produce a similar result, as, for example, in 18th 
Figure 2. Real wages, female age at marriage, and the crude first marriage rate in early modern 
England84
century Nakahara.1 Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suppose that the West European marriage 
system was attended by significant economic benefits when compared with the systems 
prevalent in much of the world before the industrial revolution.
1  T.C. Smith, Nakahara, Family farming and population in a Japanese village, pp. 1717-1830Part IV
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Are we getting sick of low incomes?
Tommy Bengtsson
In the last few years, increasing health differentials between social groups have received a lot 
of attention (Marmot, 2010). It has been argued that we become sick not only because of low 
income, but also because of increasing income differentials (Wilkinson, 1996; Wilkinson and 
Picket, 2006). Social differences in health have in recent time diverged not only in low-income 
but also in high-income countries. This is in stark contrast to the early post-war period when 
improvements in life expectancy in many countries made health authorities, health scientists 
and  politicians  believe  that  social  differences  in  mortality  had  started  to converge. The 
conclusion at the time was that inequality, when measured as death rates, was on steady 
decline, possibly even on the brink of disappearing, the reason being access to prevention and 
medication at low costs. Yet another view was that class differences in mortality had always 
existed but had stayed more or less constant (Cassel, 1976; Link and Phelan, 1995; 1996 and   
Marmot, 2004). The underlying hypothesis is that those who have greater access to economic 
resources will always be less afflicted, regardless of disease (Link and Phelan, 1996, p. 472).
The question is then whether health differentials have converged, diverged, or stayed more 
or less constant. Due to lack of coherent data covering long time periods, our knowledge has 
been based on highly incomplete evidence, from a variety of locations, and at various points 
in time. The evidence used is not only fragmentary, but furthermore only partly comparable, 
as different definitions of social class and mortality have been used. Link and colleagues 
rightly argued that “a test of the fundamental cause idea would ideally make use of a large 
bank of historical data about individuals and their disease experience that would also permit 
the identification of changes in risk factors” (Link et al., 1998, p. 378). And in the past 
decade, historians in a variety of countries have indeed taken up anew the study of social 
class-mortality differences by going back to the original sources to create such banks of data. 
These data sets allow us to test the hypotheses put forwards by Marmot and Link and Phelan.
A recent publication summarizes the results from seven new studies of locations in Western 
and Southern Europe, the US and Canada, for which individual-level longitudinal data exists 
for long time periods (Bengtsson and Van Poppel, 2011). Most of these studies also cover 
large parts of the twentieth century, for which such micro data hitherto has largely been 
lacking. Taken together, they have a wide geographic coverage and a very long time horizon.
Geneva, with a labour force of more than 20,000 in the watch-making industry alone in 
1800, saw huge but declining social differences in mortality during its 19th industrialization 
(Schumacher and Oris, 2010). The workers in the sawmill town of Sundsvall in northern 
Sweden faced higher mortality than farmers but had the same levels as the upper classes in 
the town itself (Edvinsson and Lindkvist, 2010). As industrialization took place in the last 
decades of the 19th century, no divergence in mortality took place. In Saguenay, Quebec, 
with a growing aluminium and pulp industry, mortality was about the same for all groups 
except farmers, who had significantly lower mortality up until recent time (Gagnon et al., 87
2010). In a rural area in Scania in southern Sweden, with some emerging industry after 1860, 
workers and the well-off farmers suffered from the same mortality in working ages up until 
1950, when they diverged (Bengtsson and Dribe, 2010). In Alghero, a port town in Sardinia, 
the social differences among children were substantial but did not increase as it became 
industrialized (Breschi et al., 2010). Instead, social differences in mortality either stayed 
constant or declined. The situation in the Netherlands, for which data covers a large part of 
the country, both urban and rural, was similar. The social differences found for earlier cohorts 
stays the same or diminish slightly over time (Schenk and Van Poppel, 2010). While the 
absolute differences in infant and child mortality between social groups in the US diminish 
over time, the relative differences persist and possibly expand a bit (Haines, 2010).
 
Taken together, in no case is it possible to find evidence for worsening conditions leading 
to higher mortality and/or larger social differences in mortality during the industrialization 
phase. In one case, rural Scania, we find increasing social differences in adult mortality after 
1950. We do indeed find a social gradient in mortality in urban areas, notably Geneva and 
Alghero, but these differences date further back in time, and in Sundsvall there were no 
differences at all. Instead, we discover that mortality was higher in urban than in rural areas, a 
common finding referred to as the urban mortality penalty. The findings that social differences 
in mortality were small in pre-industrial agricultural societies that are included in the studies 
of this special issue, except for cities, are consistent with findings for historical England both 
at macro level (Wrigley and Schofield, 1981; Hollingsworth, 1957 and Livi-Bacci, 1991) and 
at micro level (Clark, 2007). 
Consequently, we find no support for the hypothesis that certain fundamental and general 
mechanisms always provided the well-off with longer lives and either made social differences 
in mortality stay constant, as anticipated by Link and Phelan (Link et al.,1998; Link and 
Phelan, 1995; 1996; 2002 Phelan et al., 2004) or persistent, in the sense that well-off groups 
always have lower mortality than less wealthy groups, from one century to the next, as argued 
by Marmot (2004). Instead, we found convergence in absolute mortality differences in the 
United States during the 20th, for the Netherlands and for Alghero after circa 1900 and for 
Geneva from the 17th century onwards, and in most cases also a convergence in relative 
differences as well. In Sweden, both in the northern town of Sundsvall and in the rural area in 
southern Sweden, and also in Saguenay, Canada, we found no social differences in working 
age mortality during the industrialization period at all.
 
The reason for the lack of social differences in the past is most likely that mortality in 
communicable and often virulent diseases was high during this period. Almost all groups 
were exposed, and medical treatment was inefficient. The difference between urban and rural 
areas was therefore probably the result of differences in exposure, not resistance. Today, 
the disease pattern is entirely different, even though pandemics strike now and then. Life 
style  factors,  such  as  smoking,  diet,  and  exercise,  have  become  increasingly  important. 
Diseases are treatable and preventions are known. Overall, a consistent causal link between 
socio-economic status/income and mortality is open to serious doubt. 88
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Neither alone nor neglected:  
The elderly in a 19th century Italian city 
Renzo Derosas
In an ageing society, the conditions of the elderly present and future represent a growing 
concern of social scientists and policy makers. As for the elderly in the past, they are left to the 
hands of historians, who, for that matter, do not seem to care that much. There are obviously 
notable exceptions, but overall this remains a marginal field of enquiry.  Regrettably so, since 
the elderly represent a telling vantage point from which to observe the society as a whole and 
its inner mechanisms.
 
As a member of both social groups involved  here –the historians and the elderly– I would 
like to offer my tiny contribution, presenting the preliminary results of a study on 19th-century 
Venice. The questions addressed are to what extent the elderly were surrounded by kin 
relations –both in the household and outside– who might support them if needed, and whether 
such relations were effectively employed to that purpose.  The first question is frequently 
dealt with in studies of household composition, although kin networks outside the household 
are often neglected.  An analysis of the demographic outcomes related to the availability of 
kin is even less usual. Anyway, the answer is “yes” to both question: as the title goes, the 
Venetian elderly were neither alone nor neglected.
 
This study relies on a longitudinal sample of the Venetian population, drawn from the city 
population register and concerning the life-spells of 31,000 individuals in the period 1850 
to 1869. It includes the inhabitants of four parishes: Two were extremely poor, inhabited 
by fishermen, boatmen, porters, and other unskilled labourers; one was made up by wage 
workers, employed in glass factories, at the railway station, or in the communal slaughterhouse; 
the fourth was in the city centre, and was inhabited by families of the middle class and by 
employees, artisans and shopkeepers. The dataset also includes the whole Jewish community. 
One third of the Venetian Jews still lived in the Ghetto, while the rest was scattered around 
the city.  Also among the Jews all levels of socio-economic status were present.  Overall, the 
sample represents 15 per cent of the Venetian population.  It includes 6,279 persons aged 60 
to 79, who constitute the object of this study.
Living arrangements (figures 1-4). 
The elderly living without close kin were relatively few, around 20 per cent of the total.  Most 
lived with their spouses (63% of males and 42% of females), sons (46 and 39% respectively), 
daughters (42 and 35%), brothers (6 and 4%), sisters (5 and 7%). Furthermore, 42 per cent of 
the males and 36 per cent of the females had close kin living in the same parish: sons (11 and 
13%); daughters (13 and 15%); brothers (11 and 10%); sisters (11 and 14%).  Other kin were 
also present: the average number present in the parish range was 5.8.  Living arrangements 
varied with marital status, gender, and age. The patterns of cohabitation of widows and 
widowers were however remarkably similar: The probability of living with a son decreased 
with age, whereas the probability of living with a daughter increased. At 60, the percentage 90
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of those who lived with only a son was around 22, at 79 around 17; the corresponding figures 
for daughters where 29 and 33 respectively. Those living with both sons and daughters varied 
from 22 to 15 per cent. Elderly widowed without any children were at most 37 per cent of 
the total.
Elderly care 
Care is approximated by differential survival.  Cox proportional hazards models are used to 
test the impact on mortality of a set of confounding and exposure covariates. The confounding 
covariates are: Gender, marital status, socio-economic status, religion, current season, food 
price level, and cholera epidemic. The exposure covariates concern the presence of the spouse, 
sons, daughters, brothers, sisters, and of infants.  For siblings and children, a distinction is 
made between cohabitation and proximity.  The models also include the number of other male 
and female adult kinsfolk living in the same parish as the index person. Finally, a covariate 
describes whether the household to which  the index person belonged had changed address in 
the previous year. All covariates but the last one are expected to have had a positive effect on 
elderly survival as sources of potential support.  Elderly could also benefit indirectly from the 
presence of infants, enhancing their value as caregivers.  A change of residence was expected 
to turn out detrimental, causing the disruption of one’s social network.
 
The main results can be summarized as follows (table 1). As far as the confounding  covariates 
are concerned, marital status, socio-economic status, and food price level did not significantly 
affect mortality. Gender, religious affiliation, cholera epidemics, and current season did. 
Interestingly, the risk of death of the Jews was 26 per cent less than that of the Catholics. 
Similarly to infants and differently from the other age groups, wintertime was quite harmful 
for elderly survival.
 
When it comes to the exposure covariates, the presence of siblings was important for the 
survival of the elderly, reducing significantly the risk of death.  There is however an interesting 
difference. Brothers were helpful only when cohabiting with the index person, sisters only 
when neighboring. Also, siblings were more beneficial to males than to females, suggesting 
a gendered pattern of support. This is confirmed by the effect of children’s presence: only 
neighboring daughters significantly reduced  the risk of death of their parents, particularly 
of their mothers (-29%). Surprisingly enough, the spouse’s presence did not affect survival.
 
The condition of the elderly was jeopardized by the presence of infants, which raised their 
risk of death by 25 per cent. Possibly, they were regarded more as competitors than as 
caregivers. Yet, I have shown elsewhere that grandmothers were significantly beneficial to 
infants’ survival. Less close kinsfolk did not matter at all. On the contrary, a recent change 
of residence was apparently highly detrimental, raising the risk of death by 65 per cent. The 
increase is so huge, however, that one suspects the artefact of registration practices, whereby 
updates on moves were more likely to happen when an event such as a death was denounced.95
Childbearing and longevity – the contribution of historical demography
Martin Dribe
In the biological and bio-demographical literature there has been a great interest in the possible 
long term effects of childbearing on health and mortality. A number of studies, many of them 
published in the best scientific journals, have argued for an evolutionary trade-off between 
reproduction and longevity. According to the theory of antagonistic pleiotropy (Williams, 
1957) some genes have contradictory effects at different stages of the life course. Genes 
with an enhancing effect on the reproductive capacity may at the same time have detrimental 
effects on survival later in life (post reproduction). Natural selection tends to favor these 
kinds of genes because they maximize fitness, as higher mortality in the post-reproduction 
stage will have little impact on fitness compared to increased number of offspring. From this 
theory it follows that higher rates of reproduction comes at a cost of higher post-reproductive 
mortality and shorter life span. 
As an alternative, the disposable soma theory (Kirkwood, 1977) argues for a metabolic 
trade-off between reproduction and longevity. Reproduction demands resources which could 
otherwise be used for physical maintenance and investments. Having more children to bear 
and rear (e.g. lactation) thus uses some of the resources that could have promoted a longer 
life, leading to the hypothesis that higher reproduction is associated with shorter life span.
These theories have provoked a large number of empirical studies on both historical and 
contemporary populations. Often data from historical populations have been used because of 
less confounding from deliberate fertility control which could affect the trade-offs studied. 
A number of studies finding an effect of number of children or the timing of first and last 
birth, have also interpreted their findings as supporting the evolutionary models. For example 
Westendorp and Kirkwood (1998), in a study of the English peerage spanning a period of 
more than 1,000 years, found that more children and lower ages at first birth were associated 
with shorter life span. In a careful analysis using similar data, however, Doblhammer and 
Oeppen (2003) only found an effect for women. Smith et al. (2002) found similar results for 
Utah, which they interpreted as consistent with the evolutionary models, and this was again 
repeated in a comparative analysis of historic Utah and Quebec (Gagnon et al., 2009).
At the same time many other studies have failed to find any consistent relationship between 
childbearing history and later life mortality. In an extensive review of empirical studies, 
Hurt et al. (2006) concluded that there was “no consistent pattern in the association between 
mortality and number of births among women who have completed their childbearing”.
The interest in these issues was not that great among historical demographers to begin with. 
One reason for this may have been the strictly biological explanations invoked, leaving little 
room for individual agency or social context. We know that repeated childbearing put women 
under stress in the form of poor nutrition, physical and emotional stress, and greater exposure 
to disease, which in the long term may have detrimental effects on their health. For example, 96
breastfeeding affects the nutritional status of women as reflected in the quality of their teeth 
(see Christensen et al., 1998). Therefore it seems only logical that the contribution of historical 
demographers to this field of research has been to bring social science back into the game. 
Different papers have stressed the important role played by the socio-economic context for 
the association between childbearing history and longevity (e.g. Beise and Voland, 2002 and 
Korpelainen, 2000). A study of southern Sweden in the 19th century looked at the relationship 
between various reproductive indicators (number of children ever born, age at first birth and 
age at last birth) and mortality after age 50 for men and women separately (Dribe, 2004). 
The effects were also analyzed separately by socio-economic status, and the results clearly 
showed that number of children ever born had a negative impact on longevity. Having four 
or five children shortened women’s life span after 50 by about 3.5 years compared to women 
with one child or less. However, this effect could only be found among the poorest women. 
No effect of number of children for more well-to do women, or for men, could be found.
 
In a comparative analysis of three populations in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden in 
the 19th century, Alter et al. (2007) demonstrated the important mediating role played by 
widowhood. For women widowed at young ages (before 40) having more children meant 
significantly higher mortality after age 50, while there was no overall association between 
number of children and mortality. This seems to imply that it was not so much the number of 
children born that was important, but the circumstances under which they were raised. 
In an article using data for a preindustrial Sami population in Finland, Helle et al. (2002) 
showed that number of sons, rather than the total number of children, affected women’s 
longevity,  and  mainly  linked  it  to  biological  mechanisms  (testosterone  levels  related  to 
pregnancies). Van de Putte et al. (2004) replicated the analysis on a 19th century Flemish 
village and confirmed the association between number of sons born and female age at death, 
but could also demonstrate that the effect was only present among working class women, and 
mainly for women whose sons survived to at least to age five. This led to the conclusion that 
resource competition, rather than pregnancy related mechanisms, was the main explanation. 
As shown by these examples, the contribution by historical demography to this important 
research area has been significant by bringing the social and economic context into the 
analysis. Rather than viewing the adverse effects of childbearing on longevity as a result of 
evolutionary or metabolic trade-offs, the empirical evidence points strongly to the context 
in which women lived as the main explanation. Physical depletion following a combination 
of repeated pregnancies and deliveries, poor nutrition and hard physical labor had long-term 
adverse effects on the health and longevity of women. These negative effects were not present 
among the better nourished women in intact families, and their life spans also seem to have 
been largely unaffected by their reproductive history.    
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Excess mortality during the Dutch famine of 1940-45. 
When, where, and why? Some unresolved questions
Bertie Lumey
In a previous study of mortality during the Dutch famine, Frans van Poppel concluded that the 
immediate effects of the famine were so large that they affected the survival of the exposed 
populations (Lumey and Van Poppel, 1994).
As reviewed elsewhere, further studies at the individual level have since been carried out 
in the Netherlands to estimate possible long-term health effects of famine exposure in early 
life (Lumey et al., 2011). Most of these studies have looked at the relation between early 
life exposures during the pre-natal period and later morbidity. They have been too small 
to reliably evaluate changes in mortality, except for a recent study of men born during the 
famine (Lumey et al., submitted). A summary of mortality changes in relation to early life 
conditions after birth is also available but based on older literature (Elo and Preston, 1992). 
Outside of the Netherlands, the pioneering national cohort study of the Great Finnish Famine 
of 1866-1868 (Kannisto et al., 1997) and a regional study of the Chinese Famine of 1959-1961 
did not find differences in mortality or survival at older age for cohorts born during famine. 
Fertility  or  early  mortality  selection  during  the  Chinese  famine  may  have  changed  the 
characteristics of the survivors however, masking possible negative long-term effects (Song, 
2009). This may also have happened in Finland, as suggested by a recent analysis using frailty 
models to account for unobserved cohort heterogeneity (Doblhammer et al., forthcoming). 
Famine exposure in these studies is based on historical information regarding the timing 
and geographical distribution of the famine, and exposed and unexposed study subjects are 
defined by their date and place of birth. Sometimes, only year of birth is available for study, 
and accurate information on place of birth may also be missing. Timing of famine exposure 
in relation to critical developmental periods is sometimes feasible but the accuracy of timing 
will depend on available information on date of birth and the start and the end of the famine. 
In studies of the Dutch famine, such information has been collected and exposures have been 
classified according to distributed food rations in relation to stage of pregnancy (Stein et al., 
1975 and Lumey et al., 2007). It is worth noting that birth size and body proportions vary only 
with exposure to famine in late pregnancy (Stein et al., 2004). Birth size can therefore never 
be used to reliably estimate maternal nutrition in studies of birth weight and adult disease.
Famine exposure in nearly all studies is evaluated at the group level, as information on 
individuals is not available. In all, the exposure measures used in these studies are rather 
simple and given their limitations it is perhaps surprising that they have generated such useful 
results. 
With regard to critical exposure periods, there has traditionally been a great interest in the 
period around the growth spurt in puberty (Tanner, 1981), but current studies tend to focus on 99
very early life experiences, even before birth. It is sometimes possible to contrast outcomes 
of the same exposure in very early pregnancy versus late in pregnancy and better understand 
biological pathways related to the timing of an insult (Heijmans et al., 2008). 
Questions  about  long-term  effects  are  important  in  view  of  the  continuing  and  as  yet 
unresolved debate on the contribution of early life factors to adult health and its policy 
implications (Ben-Shlomo and Kuh, 2002). Although progress is being made and more data 
sources are being developed (Lumey and Vaiserman, forthcoming), there are not many well 
designed current studies to reliably estimate long-term effects of famine on mortality and 
life expectancy in well-defined populations. Fortunately, this is likely to be possible however 
in some studies covering the WWII period from the Netherlands on which Frans is making 
important contributions.
Estimates from the NIOD institute in Amsterdam indicate that 250,000 Dutch men and 
women may have lost their lives because of WWII (NIOD, 2012). This number includes 
war-related casualties in the Netherlands, in the former Dutch East Indies and elsewhere. It 
includes the Jewish citizens who were deported and did not survive German extermination or 
labor camps, those who died of poor health conditions, civilian casualties of war, and deaths 
during the Dutch famine of 1944-1945, and civilian casualties during the liberation of the 
Netherlands (Klep and Schoenmaker, 1995).
With regard to the famine related deaths, the current estimates of 15,000-25,000 (De Jong, 
1981; Trienekens, 1985; Klemann, 2002 and NIOD, 2012) are based on limited information. 
The reporting of vital statistics on births and deaths during the famine was incomplete on a 
national level and also in the largest affected cities in the Western Netherlands, except for 
Amsterdam. In addition, a systematic evaluation of the quality of available reports has never 
been carried out. The reporting of vital statistics was so spotty that it is worth documenting 
what data have actually been published for specific time periods and jurisdictions. For future 
reference, I have therefore summarized the available information from the Central Bureau 
of Statistics and from the municipalities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht 
regarding the war period of interest (table 1). This information should be helpful for future 
studies, although the reported numbers will need careful interpretation.
Past war- or famine-related mortality estimates have been based on ad-hoc comparisons 
of excess deaths in exposed municipalities or regions in relation to non-famine years or 
non-famine regions (Dols and Van Arcken, 1946; Neurdenburg, 1947 and Burger Drummond 
and Sandstead, 1948). Using wider time windows, yearly time trends in mortality by gender 
and cause of death from national vital statistics (CBS, 1957) have also been compared, although 
the findings and the appropriate analysis of such data are open to discussion (Futselaar, 2008 
and Lumey, 2010). A severe limitation of published national statistics is that only yearly 
figures at the national level are provided, ignoring that the famine was concentrated in the 
Western cities of the Netherlands.
With the recent availability of digitized data files from the statistical office for the Netherlands, 
covering overall mortality and causes of death by date of death in considerable detail, by 100
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gender, and in selected age groups and across all municipalities, the time has finally come 
to address some important but unresolved questions about the Dutch famine. It will now 
be possible for instance to evaluate with national mortality data when the birth and death 
counts started to change in well-defined areas, how this relates to changes in energy and 
macro-nutrient availability, which effects were immediate and which were delayed, why 
some areas were more affected than others in spite of comparable food supplies, and if some 
affected cities showed greater excess mortality than others.
It will also be possible to examine differential effects of famine on specific causes of death 
and on the timing of these deaths. With current epidemiologic, demographic, and econometric 
techniques it will be possible to address these questions in a comprehensive fashion and to 
further quantify excess mortality in relation to the timing, location, and nature of specific 
insults. These analyses will not only contribute to our knowledge of the Dutch famine itself, 
but may also help us better identify critical exposure periods over the life course for later use 
in other studies in other parts of the world. Much of this work is currently being undertaken 
by Frans, together with his colleagues Peter Ekamper and Govert Bijwaard at NIDI and with 
collaborators Aryeh Stein and myself in the United States. 
We should all hope that after his official retirement Frans will not abandon this work. I even 
hope that he will then be able to find more time to help solving some of these fundamental 
questions.
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Divergence of life expectancy and the epidemiological transition theory
Johan P. Mackenbach
Introduction
During the 20th century, life expectancy in Europe has risen strongly, but with important 
variations in both time and space, as shown in figure 1. Apart from a steady rise and some 
major interruptions we see an increasing dispersion in recent decades. This recent divergence 
is mainly due to stagnation and sometimes decline of life expectancy in Central and Eastern 
Europe (McMichael et al., 2004; Leon, 2011; Moser et al., 2005; Zatonski, 2008 and Robine 
et al., 1995). Studies have shown that recent unfavorable mortality trends in Central and 
Eastern  Europe  are  largely  due  to  unfavorable  trends  in  mortality  from  cardiovascular 
diseases, caused by various circumstances linked to the political and economic situation in 
the communist and post-communist era (Rechel et al., 2009; Leon et al., 2009; McKee et al., 
2009; Pomerleau et al., 2006 and Stuckler et al., 2009).  
It is unknown, however, how these recent trends compare to longer term developments in 
life expectancy. As figure 1 suggests, this is not the first episode of widening of the life 
expectancy gap in Europe. An earlier episode occurred during the 1920s and 1930s. Is the 
current widening more or less severe than the earlier one? Is there a general explanation that 
can account for both episodes of widening? 
The epidemiological transition theory
The theory that is most often used to explain long-term trends in mortality is that of the 
‘epidemiological transition’. During the epidemiological transition, which in different parts 
of Europe began between 1850 and 1920 (Riley, 2001), mortality declined precipitously and 
life expectancy rose in a spectacular manner, often in parallel with economic growth. What 
we generally see is rapid growth of life expectancy until about 1950-1970, followed by a 
few decades of stagnation, and then renewed growth of life expectancy starting in the period 
1970-1990 (figure 1). 
It  has  been  argued  that  rapid  declines  in  mortality  are  often  accompanied  by  growing 
disparities,  e.g.  between  countries,  regions  within  the  same  country,  or  socio-economic 
groups, and that the recent divergence of mortality and life expectancy trends in Europe 
is simply to be expected as a corollary of the latest stage in the epidemiologic transition 
(Vallin et al., 2004 and Meslé et al., 2006). The main reason is that innovations which reduce 
mortality are first implemented in some countries and then slowly diffuse to others (Rogers, 
1962). This is an appealing notion, but it carries the risk that diverging life expectancy is seen 
as a ‘normal’ phenomenon that will inevitably disappear when a natural process of diffusion 
is allowed to continue. 
In order to assess the validity of this idea it is necessary to more systematically quantify 
variation in life expectancy in Europe over the whole period 1900-2008, and to assess whether 
the two episodes of divergence in life expectancy coincided with rapid but differential declines 
of mortality from infectious diseases and cardiovascular diseases, respectively.107
Figure 1. Life expectancy trends in Europe, 1900-2008, by gender
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Convergence and divergence of life expectancy and cause-specific mortality
Table 1 shows that during the twentieth century, the inter-quartile range of life expectancy 
in Europe rose substantially between 1900 and 1920 (women) and 1930 (men), and then 
declined to reach its lowest values in 1960. After 1960, however, it started to increase again, 
to reach values in 2008 that were similar to those seen before World War II. The first episode 
of widening occurred both in Western- and in Central- and Eastern Europe, but the most 
recent episode of widening is almost entirely due to developments in Central- and Eastern 
Europe. 
Figure 2  shows  trends  in  age-standardized  mortality  from  all  causes  during  the  same 
time-period. The three trend-lines represent the life expectancy values corresponding to 
the first, second and third quartiles, respectively. In the first sub-period, all three trend lines 
declined spectacularly, both among men and among women, but at first this decline was 
more rapid in some countries than in others, causing divergence between the trend lines. This 
divergence occurred both in Europe as a whole and in Western Europe only. In the second 
sub-period we see the trend lines starting to decline and diverge again, but in this case a more 
detailed analysis shows that the divergence is due to developments in Central- and Eastern 
Europe.
Whether we should regard the current divergence as equally severe as the one occurring 
during the first decades of the 20th century depends strongly on the measure used. In absolute 
terms, current disparities in life expectancy are almost as large as those observed in 1920 and 
1930, at least among men, but in relative terms (as a fraction of median life expectancy in 
Europe) the dispersion is much less. With regard to the age-standardized mortality rates, in 108
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Figure 2. Variation in age-standardized death rates in Europe, 1901-2008, by all causus,  
by gender
Notes: ASDR = Age-standardized death rate; Q1 = age-standardized death rate at first quartile; Q2 = 
age-standardized death rate at second quartile or median; Q3 = age-standardized death rate at third 
quartile; IQR = Inter-quartile range or Q3-Q1.
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absolute terms current disparities are still well below those observed in the 1920s. In relative 
terms (as a fraction of the median), the variation in 2008 is larger than in the 1920s for men, 
and of similar magnitude for women. 
The first episode of widening occurred in a period of rapid mortality decline, mainly because 
of declining mortality from infectious diseases. Figure 3 shows that some countries lagged 
behind in their decline of mortality from infectious diseases, which led to a substantial gap in 
mortality from these causes. The second episode of widening occurred in a period of beginning 
mortality decline, driven by declining mortality from cardiovascular disease. Figure 3 shows 
that there were substantial differences between countries in the starting year of mortality 
decline for cardiovascular diseases, and that mortality still went up in some countries while it 
already declined in some others, particularly among men. The countries lagging behind were 
all in Central- and Eastern Europe. This led to a large gap in mortality from these causes. 
Conclusions
Our  results  suggest  that  both  episodes  of  widening  differences  in  life  expectancy  can 
plausibly be seen as resulting from differences between countries in timing of epidemiologic 
transitions. Although this suggests a common explanation of both episodes, at least at a very 
general level, we also found an important difference between the two episodes which casts 
doubt on a common explanation: the second episode is partly due to rising mortality in some 
countries, which we did not observe in the first episode. This second episode of widening 
disparities in life expectancy also coincided with a rising gap in national income between 
countries which was caused by the impoverishment of a part of Europe following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union (Stuckler et al., 2009 and Maddisson, 2003). This did not simply cause a 
delay in epidemiological transition but appears to have led to an actual setback. 
Therefore, interpreting the recent widening in terms of a ‘normal’ delay of epidemiological 
transitions related to the necessary diffusion of innovations across the European subcontinent, 
may well be a romantic illusion. The current episode of widening differences in life expectancy 
is an alarming phenomenon that should be a main focus of European policy making. 111
Figure 3. Variation in age-standardized death rates in Europe, 1901-2008, infectious and 
cardiovascular diseases, men
Notes: ASDR = Age-standardized death rate; Q1 = age-standardized death rate at first quartile; Q2 = 
age-standardized death rate at second quartile or median; Q3 = age-standardized death rate at third 
quartile.
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Heat waves and elderly mortality responses: What about social  
differential vulnerability? 
Michel Oris and Mathias Lerch1
In his long and so successful journey across demography and population history, Frans van 
Poppel explored many topics, always bringing original and important contributions. It was 
also the case when he addressed the relations between temperature fluctuations and the 
modernization of human behaviours, this later being apparent in the reduction of mortality 
responses. We can wonder if this long historical trend is not reaching its end and if human 
populations are not becoming again vulnerable to climatic variations. Although heat waves 
have a long history, it was in 1995 that temperature peaks emerged as ‘new social risks’ on the 
political agenda. Indeed, in July of that year approximately 750 heat-related deaths occurred 
in Chicago over a period of just five days. Eric Klinenberg’s 2002 book Heat wave: A social 
autopsy of disaster in Chicago became a bestseller since in 2003 Europe was also hit by a 
similarly brutal episode. A so-called Omega block had led to a stagnation of the weather 
pattern, creating a high-pressure ridge that lasted for several days, mainly in France, Italy and 
Switzerland. The resulting record temperatures caused an excess of deaths that is estimated to 
range from 35,000 to 55,000.2 The large majority of the victims were elderly living in urban 
agglomerations (Sardon, 2006, p. 292 and Kovatz and Jendritzky, 2006). 
Those experiences have been traumatic from both a psychosocial and a political point of 
view, and heat wave has since become an issue of general concern about the future of our 
societies. The challenges for human health are particularly intensified by the changing pattern 
of global warming, which is increasingly driven by an increase in maximum rather than 
minimum temperature and therefore mainly concerns summer rather than winter periods when 
compared to the past (Rebetez et al., 2008). Human populations are therefore increasingly 
exposed to extreme heat events and are expected to be so in the future. Indeed, despite the 
ongoing debate around climate change, predictions of an intensification of heat wave episodes 
(in frequency, intensity and duration) appear to be robust (Beniston, 2004). Furthermore, all 
demographic scenarios consistently predict a massive increase of the share of elderly people, 
thus the expectation of a growing number of frail people who can be considered vulnerable 
to the effects of climate change.  
In this context, many teams are elaborating projections combining demographic perspectives 
and climate change models. For example, Peng et al. (2011) estimate the yearly excess of 
deaths for the city of Chicago for 2081-2100 in seven global climate models. Ouranos (http://
ww.www.ouranos.ca/) does the same for Canada. The counter-view of these catastrophic 
scenarios for our future is firstly, that humanity will progressively learn how to cope with 
1  This paper is a contribution of the research group 13 to the NCCR LIVES. The NCCRs are a tool of the Swiss National 
Science Foundation and we are grateful for this support. 
2   In a 2008 published article, Jean-Marie Robine and his colleagues even estimated that ‘Death toll exceeded 70,000 in 
Europe during the summer of 2003’.
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climate change and secondly, that the decrease of winter deaths will compensate the rise of 
summer mortality. The European project Climate Trap, supported by of COST Action 730 
since 2005, has the ambitions to construct a Universal Thermal Climate Index including the 
human capacities for anticipation and acclimatization. 
Those studies and the debate about our uncertain future provide a typical illustration of the 
‘risk society’ that Ulrich Beck defined as “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and 
insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself” (1992, p. 21). We consider 
however that the attempts to predict what will happen in the next decades are premature, and 
that we still need to go back to the basis. Indeed, many crucial knots in the causal chain remain 
unclear. In this short contribution, we consider only the social dimensions of vulnerability 
when elderly are at risk of death during heat waves.
Till now few studies were able to control socio-economic factors at the individual level or, if 
they did so, only for a small sample of population or deaths. Due to constraints of the data, 
socio-economic characteristics of the whole population living in a specific place are often 
used as a proxy for status of all the inhabitants. Since this approach reduces the concept of 
contextual effects to the aggregation of individual effects, it implies an ecological bias. This 
may be one reason for the heterogeneity in conclusions of studies that investigated the effect of 
socio-economic status at the aggregate level using local percentages of unemployed or lowly 
skilled population, median incomes or other composite indexes. No effect on heat-related 
mortality was observed in Rome (Schifano et al., 2009), Brisbane (Yu et al., 2010), Budapest 
and London (Ishigami et al., 2008). However, poorer neighbourhoods had a higher excess 
mortality relative to affluent ones during heat-waves in St. Louis (Smoyer, 1998) and median 
neighbourhood income was associated to higher heat-related mortality among the non-elderly 
in Milano (Ishigami et al., 2008). Excess mortality was also higher in deprived areas of the 
city of Paris and its strongly urbanised suburbs (Rey et al., 2009). Comparing 11 US cities, 
Curriero (2002) also found a stronger mortality response to heat where the level of schooling 
was lower and poverty more prevalent. 
Canoui-Poitrine  et al.  (2006)  observed  a  change  in  both  the  geographical  and  the 
socio-economic composition of the deaths during the heat wave in Paris when compared 
to reference years. They therefore concluded that contextual and individual factors both 
matter for heat-related mortality. But in Sao Paulo, regional levels of unemployment had 
no significant impact (Gouveia et al., 2003), whereas the lower-skilled population indeed 
had a higher excess mortality. This contrasted with the findings in Mexico and Chile, where 
individual educational attainment did not have an effect (Bell et al., 2008). However, manual 
workers in France had a higher mortality than managers at older ages during heat waves 
(Vandentorren et al., 2006). 
Even when the effect of socio-economic status is estimated simultaneously at the individual and 
contextual level, results diverged. Unemployment levels did not affect heat-related mortality 
in Barcelona, but the lowest skilled elderly women were characterized by the highest excess 
mortality (Borell et al., 2006 and Browning et al. 2006). By contrast the authors showed that 115
individual socio-economic characteristics had the same effect on mortality during the 1995 
heat wave in Chicago when compared to previous summers. But neighbourhood affluence 
and commercial vitality protected individuals only during the heat wave. A more dynamic 
social ecology, it was argued, is protective against heat-related mortality since it maintains 
healthier social institutions and limits the decay of infrastructure in neighbourhoods. 
Conclusions regarding social risk factors are heterogeneous as well. Social isolation at the 
individual level is often implied from marital status, assuming the single, divorced and 
widowed to be more at risk of isolation. Unmarried elderly had indeed a higher mortality 
in Rome (Schifano et al., 2009) and in Paris (Canoui-Poitrine et al., 2006). In the latter 
however, this may have resulted from a mortality selection effect, as marital status did not 
play a role when controlling for several individual and household-level variables indicating 
social status (Vandentorren et al., 2006). Rather than marital status, living arrangement may 
specifically matter. In Modena, unmarried women did not have a higher mortality when 
controlling for negative effects associated to living in either a single-person household or 
a care institution (where people are probably frailer and accumulate co-morbidities). At the 
local level, a denser social interaction is usually expected to increase assistance to those 
people most sensible to heat. Assuming the demographically more stable neighbourhoods 
to be characterized by a higher degree of social interaction, Smoyer (1998) and Uejio et 
al. (2011) indeed observed a negative relationship with heat-related mortality in St. Louis 
and in Philadelphia. The empirical sociological investigation of Klinenberg (2002) on the 
1995 episode in Chicago showed higher vulnerability among African-Americans compared 
to Hispanics. The author attributed this difference to the fact that many African-Americans 
lived in areas of sub-standard housing and less cohesive neighbourhoods while Hispanics 
lived in areas of higher density but with more social cohesion. However, Browning et al. 
(2006) did not find an effect of the neighbourhood’s demographic stability.
This review of a rich literature that includes many excellent studies demonstrates the interest 
of the scientific community for heat episodes related mortality. However, we remain with a 
challenging puzzle of contradictory conclusions. New research designs need to be built, with 
a multilevel approach.
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Frans van Poppel and the study of perinatal and childhood mortality
Diego Ramiro-Fariñas
One of the many areas in which Frans van Poppel has been involved during his fruitful career 
is the study of mortality and more specifically the study of perinatal health and childhood 
mortality. His work focused on different aspects of this topic: Practices and care of delivery, 
via doctors or midwives, health of the mothers or infant and child mortality, among others. One 
of the areas, fetal mortality, attracted his attention during the last years via his collaboration 
with Robert Woods. International collaboration is indeed one of the gifts that Frans gives to 
the rest of the international academic community, and this area is one of many in which he 
has shown it. 
In ‘Two hundred years of evidence-based perinatal care: Late fetal mortality in the past’, 
Robert Woods, Anne Lokke and Frans van Poppel showed the longest possible time series 
of fetal mortality in several countries in Europe and pinpointed the role of the improvements 
in the quality of obstetric care and the registration of fetal deaths during that period of time. 
Despite the complications of estimating such series, as they mentioned in the paper, this 
simple comparison of the long-run time series offers some unexpected clues, such as the 
hill-shaped trend in the middle of the 19th century which also appeared in other early-childhood 
mortality estimates and for several countries in Europe. This hill shape pattern from the 
1820s to the 1850s was tentatively explained in different ways: To a certain degree it was 
associated with improvements in the quality of stillbirth registration. Iit was connected to 
socio-economic factors which were of particular importance, such as maternal nutrition, labor 
force participation and reproductive history, which has long been known to influence fetal 
growth. The possibility of premature birth or the hill shape can also be connected to the rising 
percentage of poor laborers in the populations, to the famine following the potato blight of 
the 1840s, to changes in the disease environment in which the mother lived or to something 
else. In his work, Frans used the data on Zeeland, to show that it had an extraordinary high 
percentage of stillbirths compared with the rest of the Netherlands. Zeeland had a late-fetal 
mortality rate (stillbirth rate) peaking at just over 60 per 1,000 total births in the 1860s. This 
called the attention of Dutch authorities and  therefore several special committees were set up 
to investigate the causes. These committees pointed to the absence of trained midwives and 
doctors in the province as the reasons for such high levels, and this situation did not change 
until measures to improve birth assistance in these areas were taken from the late 19th century 
onwards. In later  works Frans considered the formal and likely causes of the Zeeland trend, 
the quality of stillbirth registration, and focused in particular on the clustering of fetal deaths 
in families and social groups, making use of a highly detailed database where he explores 
both the correlates and the possible implications for such clustering. 
In both cases, Frans van Poppel and Robert Woods tried to answer some of the key questions 
for research on historical fetal and neonatal mortality patterns, such as to gather direct 
evidence for the level of late-fetal mortality in the past, using data from more statiscally 
advanced societies. To estimate the age pattern of fetal and infant mortality in high-mortality 118
populations where life expectancy at birth was less than 40 years. Or  to estimate the stillbirth 
rate from ‘knowledge’ of other mortality rates and to try to understand what form of predictive 
association exists between them, and trying to overcome the problems related with language 
and definition conventions, blurred age categories, registration practices, the organization of 
the statistical system, the estimation and the proximate causes of death and the background 
causes. 
Although in the past there have been studies dealing with differential stillbirth mortality in   
urban and rural areas or by legitimacy and some examples of those studies are given in the 
table below, there is still a lack of understanding of the levels of mortality between conception 
untill birth. How these levels were fluctuating in the past, what was the role of natural or 
intentional abortion through time and what would be the best proxi to estimate such mortality 
considering that it will be almost impossible to gather complete and detailed information on 
pregnancy loss for historical times? The attempts carried out to estimate the risk of fetal death 
by gestation duration in different studies, in follow up studies of recognized pregnancies, has 
showed very different results, especially during the first 12 weeks of gestation (see figure 1). 
On the other hand, the attempts to estimate stillbirth mortality from other infant mortality 
measures,  such  as  neonatal  mortality  or  first  week  mortality  have  been  unsuccessful. 
Considering the relevance of the influence of fetal mortality over birth outcomes and the size 
of each cohort, it is crucial to find ways in which we can disentangle this conundrum, and I 
am sure Frans will carry on doing it in the future.  
Norway Denmark Sweden France  Belgium Finland 
(1881-85)
Spain 
(1922-31)
Japan 
(1922-31)
Total births 36,7 38,9 32,7 34,4 35,9 30,0 54,1
    Capital 56,5 42,9  (69,6)
    Towns 42,5 32,2 40,7 41,5 41,7 57,8 62,4
    Rural areas 34,7 39,6 31,6 29,8 33,7 23,8 53,0
Urban/Rural 1,2 0,8 1,3 1,4 1,2 2,4 1,2
Legitimate 
births total
34,5 37,9 31,3 32,2 34,7 28,3
    Capital 45,2 37,0 (63,8)
    Towns 38,0 30,5 35,4 38,2 39,3 28,3 54,4
    Rural areas 33,6 39,3 30,8 28,4 33,1 26,2 22,8
Urban/Rural 1,1 0,8 1,1 1,3 1,2 1,1 2,4
Illegitimate 
births total
54,7 47,8 46,0 62,0 51,0 56,3
    Capital 112,6 64,3 (85,6)
    Towns 85,6 45,9 56,2 67,5 59,4 61,1 79,1
    Rural areas 49,0 43,3 41,3 53,1 44,1 44,5 44,9
Urban/Rural 1,7 1,1 1,4 1,3 1,3 1,4 1,8
Table 1. Comparative SBR for the 1860s, 80s and 1920s
Source: Woods, 2007, Pitkänen, 1983 and Ramiro and Murakoshi, 2004.119
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Figure 1. Risk of fetal death by gestation duration in different studies. (for 1,000 recognized 
pregnancies) per thousand
Source: Constructed from Gourbin, 2006.120
Demographic systems and population change: Restoring mortality  
its rightful place 
David Reher 
Demographic commonsense suggests that mortality should be a cornerstone –perhaps THE 
cornerstone- for all demographic systems both past and present. This should be the case with 
high mortality societies but also in societies characterized by moderate or even relatively 
low levels of mortality. The internal logic underlying demographic systems as defined by 
Malthus is based on the interplay between the carrying capacity of any given society and 
the way it interacts with population size and growth. Excess growth leads to falling living 
standards and eventually to demographic adjustment by means of what he termed preventive 
and positive checks. With the exception of exogenous mortality shocks –epidemics–, within 
these systems mortality is determined basically by prevailing living standards and its key role 
is how it affects growth rates. Researchers have been hard put to find a more relevant role 
for mortality in pre-industrial societies or even, for that fact, to establish clearly its sensitivity 
to economic change. Faced with the non-responsiveness of mortality to basic swings in real 
wages in England and Wales, for example, Wrigley and Schofield (1981) ended up attributing 
to fertility, and especially to nuptiality, the key to the existing demographic system, especially 
insofar as how they affected population growth rates. Researchers making use of distributed 
lag models have only found weak links between economic fluctuations and mortality in 
low-mortality countries like England. Only in higher mortality societies does the situation 
appear to be different, at least in part (Lee, 1981; Galloway, 1988 and Reher and Ortega, 
2000). 
The relative neglect of the role of mortality has carried over into research on the demographic 
transition. Contrary to the initial intuitions of Notestein, one of the most salient results of the 
European Fertility Project was that mortality and mortality change appear to have played 
little or no role in stimulating fertility change. It is not our purpose here to examine why they 
reached such an apparently counter-intuitive conclusion, but rather to show that once again 
mortality was relegated to a secondary role when explaining major demographic change, an 
orphan so to speak at the banquet of demographic enquiry on a grand scale.
Mortality is of course central to determining population growth rates and therefore key to the 
viability and resiliency of any demographic system. The way this plays out, however, is not 
how Malthus envisioned with prevailing mortality levels oscillating more or less in accord 
with short and medium-term economic swings. The key role of mortality is not so much in 
how it shapes population growth directly but how it influences fertility. There are very direct 
causal links going from mortality to both fertility and nuptiality. In the past, societies with 
high mortality were invariably ones with high fertility. Women tended to marry early when 
inheritance came early and also where there was a social awareness that they needed to have 
many childbirths if just a few were to survive. A woman who lost a child tended to have 
another one soon afterward both because she wanted another child and also because losing a 
child cut breastfeeding short and initiated a rapid return to fecundability (Reher, 1999). 121
Prevailing  mortality  levels  provide  the  ultimate  explanation  of  why  there  are  high  and 
low-pressure demographic systems in different parts of the pre-industrial world and why 
these appear to be so stable over time. It also provides the ultimate explanation of why fertility 
declined during the demographic transition, especially during its initial stages. As childhood 
mortality declined, fertility declined as well, often quite independent of whether or not women 
wanted smaller families. This has been shown forcefully in two recent publications, one of 
which I was fortunate enough to coauthor with my much-admired friend and colleague Frans 
van Poppel (Reher and Sanz, 2007 and Van Poppel et al., 2012). From a historical standpoint, 
demographic systems may be much more about mortality and mortality change than they are 
about nuptiality, fertility, family formation patterns or economic change.
This being the case, a key issue requiring the attention of demographers and historical 
demographers alike is why mortality tended to be so persistently different in different areas 
at any given moment in the past and why and how it changed. Here the answers are multiple, 
intriguing but often incomplete. Living standards are important of course, but so are climate, 
resource availability and life styles, as well as the incidence of epidemics and infectious 
disease.  It  is  also  a  matter  of  maternal  education,  especially  during  the  demographic 
transition. In many ways, childhood mortality is a product of parental expectations regarding 
child survival and in societies where this was low, parents tended to ‘expect’ their children 
to die and thus paid less attention to their health early in life. This last aspect is also a matter 
of culture, as the enormous differences in mortality for different religious groups and social 
classes in Europe has so forcefully shown. Analysis of these patterns of behavior has been a 
prominent part of much of Frans van Poppel’s most incisive work over the years (Van Poppel 
et al., 2012; 2005; 2012; Van Poppel and Nelissen, 1999 and Van Poppel, 1985). All of these 
factors come into play when explaining mortality and mortality change in the past and they 
also contribute to our understanding of demographic systems and demographic change.
Eventually the ascendancy of mortality came to an end, though not before well into the 20th 
century. The appearance of reproductive strategies based on small completed family size is 
the beginning of the end of this hegemony in the developed world though it is instructive to 
recall that this type of change could never have happened before child survival had improved 
to a point where it was no longer relevant for reproductive decisions. This also happened in 
the developing world, though in the opposite direction, when mortality declined dramatically 
during the central decades of the twentieth century and fertility no longer responded in kind. 
There too the link between them had been severed, thus marking the end of the reign of 
mortality as the key determinant of demographic systems and demographic change. 
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The impact of the 1911 heat wave on mortality in the Dutch province of 
Limburg
Willibrord Rutten 
The start of rapid mortality decline in the Netherlands was determined around 1880.1  However, 
in the southern parts of the country, in particular the provinces of Noord-Brabant and Limburg, 
the onset of the ‘new mortality regime’ came much later. Early childhood mortality declined 
less rapidly in these areas. Infant mortality rates did not show any substantial improvement 
and even increased in the province of Limburg until the early 20th century (figure 1). Cultural 
factors played a relatively important role in regional variations in mortality decline. The 
high percentage of Roman Catholics living in these areas was determined as a major factor 
contributing to the higher mortality in the South.2 In those days Catholics gave less emphasis 
to respect for life and avoidance of health hazards. For example, during the 19th century 
vaccination campaign against smallpox it turned out that Roman Catholics were less in 
favor of active prevention than mainstream Protestants.3 Hygienic awareness was low. It was 
particular the Catholic mothers who did not breast-feed their babies at all or just for a shorter 
period. It is presumed that the low incidence of breast-feeding was part of an ideological 
system, constructed by the regional clergy and the regional Catholic elite.4  This Catholic 
ideological  system  was  characterized  by  extreme  prudishness.  Misplaced  shame  of  the 
female body is said to have incited women to replace breast-feeding by bottle-feeding and 
weaning of children at an early age.5 However, it is problematic to blame Catholic doctrine 
for this. The neglect of breast-feeding was contrary to the principles of pastoral medicine 
and pastoral health care. As it was stated in Carl Capellmann’s Medicina pastoralis, an 
authoritative textbook for the Catholic clergy and seminary students: “Unde patet, certum esse 
officium matris, non fraudare infantem cibo a Deo ipso ad hoc sibi dato, sed suo ipsius lacte 
nutrire”.6  In translation: Clearly, breast-feeding is a maternal duty. It is an error to deprive 
the baby from the mother’s milk, being a nourishment created by the good Lord himself to 
feed the infants. Exceptionally, in clearly specified circumstances, Catholic doctrine allowed 
breast-feeding to be replaced by bottle-feeding, in particular during illness and in case of loss 
of earnings, which applies to young working mothers employed outside their homes.7 Other 
1  Theo Engelen, Van 2 naar 16 miljoen mensen. Demografie van Nederland, 1800-nu (Amsterdam 2009) pp. 98-99.
2  Judith Wolleswinkel-van den Bosch, The epidemiological transition in the Netherlands (Rotterdam 1998) p. 170.
3  Willibrord Rutten, ‘De vreselijkste aller harpijen’. Pokkenepidemieën en pokkenbestrijding in Nederland in de 18e en 
19e eeuw: een sociaal-historische en historisch-demografische studie. AAG-Bijdragen 36 (Wageningen, 1997) p. 342 
(graph 10.14) and p. 421.
4  F. van Poppel, ‘Religion and health: Catholicism and regional mortality differences in 19th-century Netherlandse’, 
Social History of Medicine, 5:(2) (1992) pp. 229-253.
5  P. Meurkens, Sociale verandering in het Oude Kempenland; demografie, economie en cultuur van een pre-industriële 
samenleving (Nijmegen, 1984).
6  Carl Capellmann, Medicina pastoralis (Aquisgrani 1877, 3rd edition 1893) p. 47. The Medicina pastoralis was 
translated into English, French, German, Spanish and had many editions from 1877 until at least 1926.
7  Idem, pp. 48-49.124
factors frustrating the practice of breast-feeding must be accounted for. In rural societies 
like Limburg the nursery of babies was commonly left to older sisters, aunts, grandmothers, 
allowing the mothers to resume their work on the family farm within a couple of weeks after 
delivery.
Anyhow, the diminished frequency and duration of breast-feeding resulted in a rise in infant 
mortality  in  the  province  of  Limburg.  During  hot  weather  artificial  feeding  of  children 
became even more difficult than it already was under normal circumstances. The relationship 
between temperature and mortality in the Netherlands was tested for a long historical period 
by Frans van Poppel cum suis in an unique empirical study.8 They found out that children 
were by far the most vulnerable group when temperature peaked. Effects of heat on mortality 
were observed within one or two days and the impact was strongest for infants below age 
one. Delayed effects of extremely high temperatures were found among the youngest age 
groups too, until four weeks after a heat wave. They also observed strong regional differences 
8  Peter Ekamper, Frans van Poppel, Coen van Duin and Kees Mandemakers, ‘Heat waves and cold spells and their effect 
on mortality: An analysis of micro-data for the Netherlands in the 19th and 20th centuries’, Annales de Démographie 
Historique (2010) pp. 55-104.
Figure 1. Infant deaths per 1.000 live births in Limburg and the Netherlands. Annual figures, 
1851-1975 (deceased before registration included from 1918)
Source: Verslag van den toestand van het hertogdom Limburg (1851-); Statistisch Jaarboek voor het 
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (1857-); Jaarcijfers voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (1892-); 
Statistiek van den loop der bevolking in Nederland (1900-); Statistical Yearbook (1970-).
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in the effect of heat on mortality. However the southern province of Limburg, by neglect of 
breast-feeding highly vulnerable for periods of heat and drought, was not included in the 
dataset. In the summer of 1911 the people of Limburg had to cope with 22 tropical days 
(≥30°C).9  What was the impact of the 1911 heat wave on Limburg mortality? 
Mortality data were retrieved from the GENLIAS-database.10 I used meteorological data 
from the Maastricht weather station.11 The distance between the weather station and the 
area for which the weather measurements were considered indicative was acceptable. The 
distance between the weather station and any of the province’s municipalities for which we 
had mortality data was about 111 kilometers in straight line.
Applying the definition12 of the Netherlands Royal Meteorological Institute to the weather 
station in Maastricht the south of the country witnessed in 1911 a prolonged heat wave that 
lasted from 20 July to 14 August, including 11 summer days and 15 tropical days. Highest 
maximum temperatures were measured on 23 July (36,2°C) and 28 July (36,3°C). The heat 
wave was followed by a second episode of warm weather lasting from 18 August to 13 
September. The period from 1 September to 13 September almost generated a second heat 
wave, including 6 summer days and 5 tropical days, but cannot be qualified as such because 
this episode of extremely high temperatures was interrupted twice by a one day cooling down 
(maximum temperature 23,7 and 22,0°C).
The impact of extreme temperatures on death rates is presented in figure 2, showing the daily 
mortality ratio (the observed number of deaths in a day divided by the average number of 
deaths per day in that year) and the average 24-hour temperature from May to October 1911. 
The daily mortality ratio was calculated both for all ages and ages below 2. The summer 
of 1911 had devastating effects, with mortality ratios for all ages incidentally exceeding 
values around two (a doubling of the expected number of deaths). The effects of extreme 
heat consisted of a more or less instantaneous effect and a more delayed effect, in particular 
on early childhood mortality. Temperature peaked for the first time around 7 July which was 
followed by a peak around 13 July in the number of deaths of children up to two years. For 
the next few days mortality receded. After the heat wave beginning around 20 July mortality 
started to increase again, but did not return again on its pre-peak level though temperature 
declined for a few days. Each new peak in temperature generated a surplus mortality that was 
added to the up-trending mortality level generated by the delayed effects of earlier peaks in 
temperature. A time lag of about four weeks is observed between highest temperatures and 
highest mortality.
9  As compared to 12 in the north and the center of the Netherlands.
10  By courtesy of Regionaal Historisch Centrum Limburg (Ria Cruts).
11  KNMI, Daggevens van het weer in Nederland. Electronic source retrieved (2012) from http://www.knmi.nl/
klimatologie/daggegevens/download.html
12  According to the official definition by the Netherlands Royal Meteorological Institute a heat wave is defined as a 
period of at least five days, each with a maximum temperature of at least 25°C (called summer days), including at 
least three days with a maximum of temperature of at least 30°C (called tropical days) measured at the De Bilt station 
located in the centre of the Netherlands during a period of at least five days.126
The strong effects of heat that were observed among infants and young children were caused 
mainly by high rates of gastrointestinal diseases.13 This was first of all a consequence of high 
proportions of artificially fed children. The quality of foods such as milk and bread porridge 
deteriorated at high temperatures; the quality of water, used to dilute milk or prepare other foods, 
was extremely bad as well during periods of heat and drought; and purity of feeding bottles 
and teats could not be guaranteed. These factors played a role in the excessive vulnerability of 
infants in Limburg. These findings largely corroborate the conclusions of Van Poppel cum suis 
in relation to the impact of 1911 heat wave on mortality in the province of Zeeland.14 
The heat wave of 1911 marked the last episode of extreme infant mortality in Limburg. From 
now on (1912) infant mortality dropped in an unprecedented way (figure 1). The devastating 
1911 heat wave alarmed political and health care authorities in the province to intervene by a 
major campaign to eliminate bottle feeding and other bad nursery practices.15 
13  Jaarverslag van de Gezondheidscommissie ingesteld voor de Gemeenten Baexem, Beegden, Grathem (1911) p. 
15. Verslag van de bevindingen en handelingen der Gezondheidsscommissie gezeteld te Gulpen, ingesteld voor de 
vereeniging van gemeenten, omvattend Bocholtz, St. Geertruid, Gulpen (1911) p. 10.
14  Ekamper et al., ‘Heat waves and cold spells’, p. 73.
15  J.F.R. Philips, Gezondheidszorg in Limburg. Groei en acceptatie van de gezondheidsvoorzieningen 1850-1940 (Assen 
1980).
Figure 2. Daily mortality ratio (scales left) and average 24-hour-temperature (°C) (scales right) in 
the Dutch province of Limburg, May to October 1911
Source: KNMI and RHCL, Genlias database.
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term trends in occupational gender stratification and female labour force participation.Forty years of groundbreaking research in historical demography did not go unnoticed. At 
the occasion of his formal retirement as Senior Researcher at the Netherlands Interdisci-
plinary Demographic Institute (NIDI), in December 2012, this volume of short essays –a 
Liber Amicorum– is dedicated to Frans van Poppel and his scholarly work.
From the 1970s onwards, Frans van Poppel has been one of the leading academic figures 
in the field of historical population studies, both at the national and international levels. He 
produced an abundance of influential publications in leading scholarly journals and a number 
of volumes dealing with central issues in historical demography. His 1992 doctoral dissertation 
Trouwen in Nederland. Een historisch-demografische analyse van de 19e en vroeg-20e eeuw 
has been a classic on nuptiality ever since. Throughout his career, which includes a L.G. 
Rogier Chair at the History Faculty of Radboud University Nijmegen (1998-2001) and the 
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Frans van Poppel applied and developed a strong interdisciplinary approach combining 
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The significance of Frans van Poppel as a leading historical demographer is made clear in the 
various contributions to this publication which focus on issues that are central to historical 
demography as a whole and Frans van Poppel’s work in particular: Data and methods, fertility 
and nuptiality, and aging and mortality. The authors, all national and international academic 
colleagues in the field of social and economic history and historical demography –directly 
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